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INTRODUCTION 
The flags of the Pope and of the German Reich flew side by side 
in front of Saint Hedwig's Cathedral in Berlin on September 23, 1933. 
Catholic youth groups, their pennants and banners held aloft, paraded 
down Unter den Linden on their way to Kaiser Franz Joseph Platz and 
the cathedral. Large delegations of Catholic men's and women's asso-
ciations proudly displayed their own banners as they converged on the 
square via Niederwallstrasse. Adding to the pageantry were uniformed 
formations of Catholic Sturmabteilung (SA), who marched to the festive 
music of their bands while flourishing still more flags and banners. 
The Catholics of Berlin were celebrating the ratification of the Con-
cordat concluded between their Church and the German Reich two weeks 
earlier. 
Representing Pope Pius XI at the High Mass inside the cathedral 
was Nuncio Cesare Orsenigo. Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen was seated 
in the first row as an honored guest, flanked by officials from the 
Interior Ministry and Foreign Office. The service was also graced by 
the presence of officials from the Schutzstaffel (ss), the SA, and the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP). Loudspeakers 
carried the mass to the many thousands on the adjoining square who 
could not be accommodated inside the cathedral itself. 
After the gospel reading Cathedral Minister Maria.nus Vetter 
ascended the pulpit to herald the significance of the moment and the 
meaning of the Concordat. The treaty, according to the minister, marked 
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an epochal reconciliation of Church and State, of "our Mother Church 
and our Fatherland." It was a covenant between the Holy Father of all 
Catholics and the leader of the great German people's movement. The 
latter was "a man of marked devotion to God who is sincerely concerned 
for the well-being of the German people, and who will govern them in 
accordance with the will of the Divine Creator." The Concordat, con-
tinued Vetter, had no winners or losers and included no compromises. 
Rather, it had been negotiated in a spirit of friendly cooperation 
and was comprised of a number of exchanges which worked to the benefit 
of the Church, the State, and, above all, the German people. In essence, 
the State recognized and guaranteed the Christian mission of the Church, 
and the Church acknowledged its promise to promote the interest of the 
German community. In closing, the minister added that all twenty mil-
lion German Catholics had assumed the oath of allegiance to Fatherland 
and State that their bishops had sworn, "for it is for us a responsi-
bility to God and a heartfelt wish not only to be Catholic Christians, 
but Catholic Germans as well." At the conclusion of the service Vicar 
General Paul Steinmann of Berlin read for the first time the prayer 
for the German Reich and the FUhrer as prescribed by the Concordat. 
Nuncio Orsenigo then blessed the dignitaries inside the cathedral and 
the huge crowd gathered in the square. The gala affair was capped by 
singing each of the opening verses of the German national anthem and 
the Horst Wessel song. 
Not all Church leaders in Germany were as enthralled by the rati-
fication of the Concordat as the celebration in Berlin would suggest. 
The period between the signing of the treaty on July 20 and its official 
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sanction on September 10 had convinced most of the bishops that Hitler 
would either ignore the document or interpret it to his own advantage. 
While the episcopate as a whole had voted to support the ratification 
of the Concordat, many individual bishops had refused to authorize a 
~ ~· Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, presiding head of the Munich-
Freising Bishop's Conference, which included all of the Bavarian bish-
ops, felt that the Berlin service sufficed for the whole Reich and 
refused to order thanksgiving services in Bavaria. Cardinal Adolf 
Bertram headed the much larger Fulda Bishop's Conference, which in-
cluded the remainder of the German bishops, and in mid-August had 
already rejected the idea of a general :!!, ~· "It is neither in-
gratitude nor sulkiness on my pa.rt," he explained, "but grave concern." 
Berlin party leaders had, in fact, gone to the nuncio to arrange their 
celebration because they were convinced that no support would be forth-
coming from the German bishops. 
This thesis will examine the response of the German bishops to 
the Reichskonkordat in the period between April 10 and September 10. 
It will also explore the relationship of the bishops to National Social-
ism and the Vatican before and during concordat negotiations. The 
literature on the Reichskonkordat has necessarily focused on the roles 
pl~ed by the Vatican and the Nazi government. They were, after all, 
the principal negotiators of the treaty and remain the center of in-
trigues during its developing stage. But the German bishops a.re an 
important pa.rt of the Reichskonkordat story. They had close but not 
always comfortable relations with both the Vatican and the Nazis during 
this period. They were obviously close to the issue being discussed 
and had a major interest in the outcome. In short, the bishops were 
in a key position to give us an on-the-scene idea of what was taking 
place, or, what is perhaps just as important, what they thought was 
taking place. 
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The German bishops found themselves in an uncomfortable position 
when Hitler came to power in early 1933. Two years earlier, after the 
massive gains posted by the Nazi party in the Reichstag elections of 
September 1930, the episcopate had placed a collective ban on member-
ship in the party. The ban resulted from the inconsistencies of the 
party's espousal of "positive Christianity" with Catholic doctrine and 
remained in effect through the elections of March 5. As late as March 
19 Cardinal Bertram had written his fellow bishops that a change in 
political conditions did not constitute a reason to revise the Church's 
position. But the passage of the Enabling Act on March 23 made the 
Catholic political parties, long the protectors of Church interests, 
anachronisms. The bishops withdrew their ban five dey-s later, appar-
ently succumbing to a combination of pressures and promises. Their 
declaration of March 28 marked a dramatic shift in attitude toward 
National Socialism. Coming as it did on the eve of Concordat negoti-
ations, it will be given careful attention. 
One reason that the German bishops have not attracted more atten-
tion in the Reichskonkordat literature is that information tying them 
to the negotiations is simply hard to come by. To a large extent this 
is due to the very limited role that the bishops pley-ed in the negoti-
ations, a decision that rested with the Vatican. To be sure, Church 
law left the settlement of concordats completely in the hands of the 
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Pope, who generally worked closely with the Cardinal Secretary of State 
in diplomatic affairs. Major decisions were made after consultation 
with members of the Sacred College. But in practice, bishops and 
Catholic political officials were also consulted during concordat 
negotiations. Such was the case with the Austrian Concordat in 1933 
and with each of the three L~der concordats negotiated in Germany 
during the Weimar period-Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden 
(1932). The German bishops were also involved when the Reichskonkor-
2!1 issue was first conceived in 1920. Thus the nonpresence of the 
episcopate throughout most of the negotiations in 1933 was, in the 
words of historian Klaus Scholder, "highly unusual." 
The relationship of the bishops to the Vatican was a particularly 
interesting one. It is often assumed that they were faithful supporters 
of Vatican policy, but the bishops had views of their own which, espe-
cially in the developing stages of the Reichskonkordat, did not alw~s 
coincide with the Vatican's. Loyalty to Rome and ca.re for the souls 
of its flock were foremost concerns of the episcopate, but these came 
into conflict at times and were difficult to reconcile. The primary 
reason was that Vatican policy was designed for the whole of Europe 
and with a period of centuries in mind. The bishops had only their 
dioceses before them and were concerned with the here and now. Over 
the course of this thesis, I hope to demonstrate that the German bishops 
were responding as much to the wishes of the Vatican in 1933 as to the 
pressures of National Socialism. 
Historian John Conw~ has written that the episcopate's "own in-
ternal feuding was as much to blame for its weaknesses as were the · 
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pressures from the Nazi state." He may have been overstating his 
point, but Conway does bring out the fact that the response of the 
bishops to the Reichskonkordat or National Socialism was never a single 
or united one. Reactions varied from north to south and from diocese 
to diocese, often depending on the intensity of persecutions leveled 
at the Church and its organizations. I have tried to show that the 
division within the episcopate reflected the historical development 
of the Church in Germany, and that the National Socialist revolution 
had forced the Church to come to terms with itself as much as with the 
new state. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the German 
bishops were living in a period of extreme turmoil and, like other 
Germans in 1933, were struggling to survive. 
CHAPTER I 
THE STRUGGLES AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF GERMAN CATHOLICISM: 
19th CENTURY THROUGH WEIMAR 
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic era had a profound in-
fluence on the Catholic Church in Germany and established the framework 
within which modern church-state relations would develop. The dissolu-
tion of the Holy Roman Empire, the confiscation of church lands, the 
secularization of ecclesiastical states, the shifting of territorial 
boundaries so that Protestants and Catholics were united in one state, 
and the concept of the religiously neutral state were a few of the 
changes that demanded a new understanding between church and state.1 
That representatives at the Congress of Vienna refused to consider a 
comprehensive settlement of church affairs in Germany, fearing the 
unification of a nation that would upset the balance of power on the 
continent, insured that the particularism and territorial fragmentation 
that had run like red threads through German history would continue to 
affect the Catholic Church. 2 
With the inclusion of Austria, Catholics and Protestants were 
about evenly divided in the German Confederation at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century.3 However, the reorganization of Germany had 
left only two predominantly Catholic states, Austria and Bavaria, with 
large groups of Catholics becoming citizens of Prussia, Hanover, Wurt-
temberg, Baden, Hesse, and smaller Protestant states.4 The Vatican was 
left to negotiate agreements with a number of these states in order to 
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guarantee the rights, privileges, and financial claims of the Church. 
A concordat was concluded with Bavaria in 1817 and final agreements 
were reached with Prussia in 1821 and governments of the Upper Rhine 
church province in 1827. A reorganization of dioceses in accordance 
with the new territorial boundaries was also established in these areas. 
No hierarchies were erected in the other German states, which were 
overwhelmingly Protestant. Instead, they were later joined to the 
Prussian or Upper Rhine bishoprics or remained mission territories.5 
The German bishops were also placed in a new relationship to 
both church and state at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Deprived of their secular territorial jurisdictions, they were no 
longer directly involved in small-state rivalry. Threatened with con-
trol by state governments and no longer able to look to their princes 
for support and leadership, the bishops began to turn more and more 
to the Pope and a policy of ultramontanism. 6 The loss of political 
power within the German Catholic Church also led to a change in the 
church hierarchy. Where formerly bishop's sees had been the domain 
of the high nobility, leaders of the Church in this modern era were 
beginning to come up from the ranks of the low clergy. Theological 
training and "field experience" would be the hallmarks in the modern 
era.7 
The nineteenth century created the same challenges for Catholi-
cism in Germany that it did in most other European countries. The 
tremendous increase in secularization, claims of the modern state to 
absolute sovereignty over the individual, and the developnent of modern 
nationalism were especially serious.8 For a religion attempting to be 
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ecumenical and international in scope and seeking to embrace and regu-
late the totality of an individual person's life, these were serious 
challenges indeed. German Catholics dealt with secularization on an 
equal basis with other European Catholics, but statism and nationalism 
presented special problems. Because of their minority status in most 
of the German states, German Catholics for the meet part have been 
opposed to statism. Like any minority group, they were forced to seek 
political guarantees against absolute state power. The notable excep-
tion was Bavaria, where Catholics were massed and made up the vast 
majority of the population. In the Bavarian situation state authority 
was often closely allied with the Church.9 
German Catholics have also been vulnerable to the charge of 
constituting a "state within a state," in part because of their op-
position to statism and extreme nationalism. To escape any suspicion 
of their loyalty, however, Catholic leaders have often responded with 
a super-heated patriotism. The attitude of Bishop Wilhelm Emanuel von 
Kettler following the war of 1866 provides a prime example. Kettler 
responded to the suspicion of deficient Catholic patriotism during the 
Austro-Prussian War by violently attacking the French and all German 
imitation of French ideas. Examples abound during the period of the 
Kulturkampf and on the eve of the First World War. The efforts of 
German Catholics to appear more nationalistic than the National So-
cialists would work to their disadvantage later on.10 
Between 1815 and 1918 German Catholics were able to develop a 
strong political party (the Center Party) to protect their interests, 
a wide variety of lay organizations, and a vigorous press. The Church, 
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meanwhile, was able to expand its monastic and educational network 
throughout Germany. 11 In order to secure their position, the German 
Catholics and their Church had to survive some major confrontations 
with the state, in particular the Cologne Dispute of 1837 and the 
Kulturka.rnpf of the 1870's. Much of the intellectual and emotional 
character of German Catholicism sprang from these confrontations. 
A German historian, Koppel Pinson, has written that all major 
conflicts between church and state in Germany in the nineteenth cen-
tury basically involve three issues: anti-centralization, autonomy 
of the Church, and freedom for religious education. 12 The Cologne 
Dispute of 1837, first of the great church-state controversies, cer-
tainly fits Pinson's description. The dispute originated in the Rhine-
land and focused on the question of mixed marriages and educational 
preference for offspring. Canon law required priests, before giving 
their blessing to a mixed marriage, to make sure that all children 
would be brought up as Catholics. The Prussian law of Frederick the 
Great which dealt with mixed marriages held that male children should 
follow the religion of their father and female children that of their 
mother. Thus, the canon law of the Church and the law of Prussia came 
into direct conflict. No major problems developed in Prussia's eastern 
provinces because the population was predominantly Protestant and be-
cause the Catholic clergy did not enforce canon law provisions when 
mixed marriages did occur. The situation was different in the western 
Prussian provinces, however, where the mix of Catholics and Protestants 
was greater and where the clergy was more insistent on following Church 
1 13 aw. 
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A state of crisis was reached when the Prussian government ar-
rested Archbishop of Cologne Clemens August von Droste-Vischering on 
November 20, 1837 and interned him in the fortress of Minden.14 Though 
protests and popular demonstrations ensued, they did.not prevent the 
arrest and removal from office of several other Catholic bishops.15 
In fact, the conflict spread to eastern Prussia when the Archbishop 
of Posen-Gnesen decided to enforce the marriage provisions laid down 
by canon law and was also imprisoned in 1839. The Bishop of Breslau 
chose to resign his office in 1840 when the Pope insisted he enforce 
the same provisions.16 Since the Prussian state was without a parlia-
mentary constitution, Catholics were unable to exert any organized polit-
. 1 . t• 17 ica opposi ion. 
The Cologne incident provoked a sharp response from Catholics 
across Germany. Joseph Gorres, recognized today as the founder of 
"political Catholicism," wrote numerous essays from Munich on behalf of 
the catholic cause. (Gorres had been expelled from Prussia for his pro-
French secessionist activities in the Rhineland.)18 In particular, his 
booklet, Athanasius, became a major force in mobilizing Catholic public 
opinion to form an active front against the Prussian state. It became, 
in the words of Pinson, "the great trumpet call for the political 
equality of Catholics and for the freedom of the Catholic Church. 111 9 
Gorres' ''Munich Circle" was the first group to feel itself responsible 
for the Catholic cause in all of Germany. Because of Gorres' efforts 
in the Cologne Dispute there emerged for the first time a nationwide 
Catholic grouping in which all of the old classes, from nobility to 
20 peasantry, took part. 
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Prussian Catholicism emerged from the Cologne Dispute stronger 
and more united than before. Frederick William IV became King of 
Prussia in 1840 and quickly established religious peace. In addition 
to abolishing the Placet (the obligation of the Church to receive 
state approval before publishing decrees) he provided for separate 
Catholic and Protestant bureaus in the Ministry of Education and Church 
Affairs. In effect, these measures left both churches more autonomous. 
The Prussian Constitution of 1850 would later give both churches the 
right to regulate their own affairs, with the state retaining certain 
. . ht 21 supervisory rig s. 
The German Catholics also survived the revolution of 1848 quite 
nicely. Capitalizing on the surge toward liberty that brought together 
diverse elements in the German National Assembly in Frankfurt, German 
Catholics also created a "center of unity" for themselves. The First 
Catholic Assembly met in Mainz in 1848, beginning a tradition of yearly 
conventions. The Assembly focused on cultural and religious questions 
facing German Catholics and took a leading stand on some of the most 
pressing social issues of the day. Emmanuel von Kettler, also known 
as "the social bishop," pl~ed a prominent role. He declared: 
In striving for an understanding of our time we must strain 
every effort to fathom the Social Question. Whoever achieves 
this has taken firm hold of this present era; those who2~ail in this will find the present and the future an enigmal 
Under his leadership the groundwork of social reform was accomplished 
upon which the mature movement of "Social Catholicism" would develop.23 
A conference of all the German bishops (including the Austrian 
episcopate) also met in 1848 to set up a common center for the defense 
of their interests in Church affairs.24 Unfortunately, this Fulda 
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Bishop's Conference was not nearly as successful as the Catholic As-
sembly in Mainz. A proposal ma.de by the conference to unify the hier-
archically divided leadership of German Catholicism by creating a Reich 
Church Constitution under a German Primate was rejected out of hand by 
Rome. Rome was too well aware of the precedent of Febronianism under 
Joseph II with its radical episcopal tendencies and its attempt to 
create a separatist national Church.25 Understandable as its reasons 
were, Rome's veto of the Fulda plan made it impossible for the German 
episcopate to achieve the organizational unity necessary for common 
action toward common aims, a unity which would have proved very helpful 
in the struggles to come.26 
The greatest controversy between church and state in Germany in 
the nineteenth century was the Kulturkampf •27 The effects of this 
"struggle for civilization" had a major impact on the psyche of German 
Catholics well into the twentiety century. Historians cite several 
causes for the onset of the conflict. Among the important underlying 
causes was the Prussian victory in the war of 1866 which removed Austria, 
the largest Catholic state, from German affairs. The results of the 
Austro-Prussian War supplied the main impetus for the creation of a 
national political party to represent Catholic interests.28 A Center 
Party was founded in 1870, and about fifty Centrists were elected to 
the Prussian diet. Fifty-seven deputies of the Center were also elected 
to the first Reichstag on March 3, 1871, which made the Center the 
second largest party in the Reich.29 Bismarck was not only troubled 
by the Center's presumed links with Rome, but also by the Party's close 
relations with the "party of Bavarian patriots," a radical particularist 
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group which was decidedly anti-Prussian, a small Polish faction, and 
a small group of conservative Protestant Hanoverians, the Guelph Party, 
who rejected the Prussian annexation of Hanover and demanded the resto-
ration of the Kingdom of Hanover under its old dynasty.30 Ludwig 
Windthorst, a member of the Guelph faction, would rise to the leader-
ship of the Center Party during the Kulturkampf. 
The tensions which separated liberalism from Catholicism in the 
second half of the nineteenth century were also factors leading to the 
Kulturkampf. Pope Pius IX exasperated these tensions with his Syllabus 
of Errors in 1864, which condemned the "errors of Liberalism," and his 
dogma of Papal Infallibility on July 18, 1870.31 The latter was occa-
sion for an onslaught against the German Catholic Church by the combined 
forces of German liberalism and the government of Bismarck. The anti-
clericalism of the National Liberal Party was promoted most aggressively 
in the field of education.32 
While the motivations which led Bismarck into the struggle are 
not entirely clear, he began his attack by dissolving the Catholic 
section of the Prussian Ministry of Education and Church Affairs in 
July of 1871. An order of March 1872 called for the abolition of the 
supervision of schools by the churches. On November 28, 1871 Bismarck 
added the "Pulpit paragraph" to the criminal code, which forbade the 
clergy in their official capacity to deal with political matters. A 
law on June 11, 1872 excluded the Jesuits and certain related orders 
from Germany.33 While similar legislation was passed in other European 
countries and other states within the Reich, the persecution of the Cath-
olic Church reached its most acute stage in Prussia with the adoption of 
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the so-called Falk laws of 1873 and 1874. Named after Minister of 
Culture, Adalbert Falk, the first of the infamous laws provided that 
the clergy must receive their education at a German Gymnasium and uni-
versity, and that candidates for ecclesiastical positions had to pass 
an examination in philosophy, history, and German literature before 
a state board. Other laws were passed giving the state control of 
church disciplinary measures and requiring bishops to submit the names 
of parish appointments to local district government officials. A law 
in March 1874 ma.de civil marriage compulsory.34 
Catholic bishops met at Fulda during this period and declared 
that "no Catholic Christian could aclmowledge these laws or voluntarily 
obey them without the gravest violation of his faith."35 When Church 
officials refused to inform local government officials of new parish 
appointments, several bishops were arrested and parishes became vacant. 
The Archbishops of Posen, Cologne, and Trier all spent terms in jail.36 
A papal encyclical on February 5, 1875 declared all Prussian laws which 
"contra.diet the divine institution of the Church" null and void, and 
threatened all those who complied with them with excommunication.37 
But the government countered by stopping all state support of the Church 
until bishops accepted state laws. Later, all monastic orders were 
banned from Prussia except those devoted exclusively to hospital work, 
and all articles of the Prussian constitution guaranteeing autonomous 
government to the churches were cancelled. By 1876 all of the Prussian 
bishops were imprisoned or had been driven to take refuge abroa.d..38 
The number of bishops in the Reich was reduced from 12 to 4 due to the 
removal of six and the failure to fill two vacancies resulting from 
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death. Of the 4,604 Catholic parishes in Prussia, 1,103 were no longer 
in operation. More than 2,000,000 of the 8,000,000 parishioners were 
without regular pastoral care.39 
Even during the most oppressive stages of the Kulturkampf there 
were signs that Bismarck and the Prussian state were fighting a losing 
battle. The Centrists increased their representation from 63 to 91 
deputies in the 1873 elections for the Prussian diet. Then, in the 
Reichstag elections of 1874, the Center increased its representation 
to 91 seats and polled 27.7 per cent of the vote.4° An opportunity 
to settle differences came with the death of Pius IX in 1878 and the 
peaceful gestures of the new Pope, Leo XIIr. 41 Bismarck was quick to 
grab the olive branch. Falk was relieved from his post in 1879 and the 
ousted bishops were reinstated. Churches were reopened and parishes 
were allowed to have their own priests back. By 1881 all was peaceful 
again in relations between church and state. Legislation in 1887 
brought the Kulturkampf officially to a close.42 
The Kulturkampf left a deep psychological scar on German Catholics 
and their Church. They would not easily forget being branded "enemies 
of the Empire." Nor could they forget the persecutions aimed at their 
subjugation.43 A major result of the Kulturkampf was that Catholics 
turned inward and felt the need to organize as a separate camp in every 
field of life. They accomplished this to an amazing degree. Monastic 
orders, which were the backbone of the Catholic educational system, were 
again permitted throughout Germany in the mid-1880's and the number of 
institutions returned in record numbers. There were 922 in 1883, 2,873 
in 1898, and over 7,000 in 1912.44 The Catholic press also flourished 
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after the Kulturkampf. In 1871 there were 126 Centrist newspapers with 
a total circulation of 322,000. By 1912 this had mushroomed to 446 
papers and a circulation of 2,624,900.45 Numerous Catholic lay organ-
izations emerged as well, cutting across state and diocesean boundaries 
and uniting Catholics to the Church as never before.46 But the key 
development for the Church was found in the political sphere, where 
the Center Party emerged as a real force in German politics. "Katho-
lisch ist Trumpf" became the expression in political circles, for the 
Center, with its fairly stable representation of 100 delegates and its 
disciplined party organization, became "the political arbiter of Ger-
many."47 
Ironically, the Center Party also reflected another trend of 
German Catholicism after the Kulturkampf. The party's actions were 
concerned as much with fitting into German society as they were in 
turning away from it. (This was, no doubt, a reflection of the behav-
ior of many German Catholics who, it might be added, drifted away from 
the Center as time went by.) While the membership of the Center Party 
was certainly united and ready to face any assault upon the freedom of 
the Church, there were nevertheless some sharp differences within the 
party on political questions and philosophy. During the reign of 
Wilhelm II the leadership of the Center was essentially conservative. 
The party served the Church and the Church supported the party. During 
this same period, however, there was a strong push by the left wing of 
the party (centered in the Rhineland) to broaden the base of the Center 
and turn it more in the direction of liberal and democratic policy. 
The basis was thus laid for the Center's coalition with the Social 
Democrats and other republican groups during the last years of the 
First World War and throughout the Weimar era.48 That relationship 
would not always be looked on favorably by Church leaders. 
Relations between church and state underwent a dramatic change 
during the Weimar years and presented a mixed blessing for German 
Catholicism. Out of the chaos of the war and peace settlement (and 
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an internal revolution which threatened to ravish the country), a 
democratic government had replaced the German monarchy. Together with 
the SPD and German Democrats, the Center Party played a key role in 
anchoring the new government and drawing up a constitution which pro-
vided much more favorable conditions for the Church than did the laws 
and institutions of the Imperial period. The right of association and 
organization was guaranteed to all religions, the rights of the State 
to interfere in Church affairs were curtailed, and the automatic right 
of the government to approve Church appointments was abolished.49 
Before Weimar the Church had benefited largely only in those areas 
where Catholics were in the majority. The Weimar Constitution now made 
it possible to protect the interests of all German Catholics, not just 
those of the large German states.50 
There were some very important matters that the Constitution had 
left unresolved, however. While some ambiguous language characterized 
the articles dealing with relations between church and state and the 
competencies of state and national governments, the Church was most 
concerned with educational matters. The Center had withstood pressures 
from their coalition partners to establish a national school system 
inimical to the interests of the Church.51 Since no agreement could 
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be reached on the issue, a compromise was worked out whereby the future 
federal legislature was authorized to formulate a national school law 
(Reichsschulgesetz). In the meantime, the Constitution provided for 
the inclusion of religion in the curriculum in all but secular schools 
and the right of the State to supervise religious instruction.52 The 
failure to pass a national school law that would satisfy all parties 
was a major reason behind the failure to conclude a Reichskonkordat 
during the Weimar period. 
After the Versailles settlement German Catholics were numerically 
more of a minority than before, composing less than one-third of the 
population. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the ceded parts of Prussia 
involved more Catholics than Protestants. Still, the loss of the Polish 
and French-speaking peoples had left German Catholics far more united. 
With the shedding of these non-German groups and the addition of consti-
tutional guarantees for religion, Catholics began to overcome the 
"minority complex" that had haunted them in the past. Educationally, 
economically, and politically they began to enter the mainstream of 
German life.53 This situation manifested itself most clearly in the 
political sphere, where the Center Party consistently polled 12 to 13 
per cent of the national vote and members of the Center held the chan-
cellorship in 8 of 14 cabinets between 1918 and 1933.54 
The Catholic Church took advantage of the right of association 
and organization guaranteed all religions to expand its networks. In 
1920 there were 366 monastic establishments for men with 7,030 members 
and 616 novices. In 1932 there were 640 with 13,206 members and 1,910 
novices. The number of Catholic theological students at universities 
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or equivilent institutions rose from 2,648 in 1923 to 4,864 in the sum-
mer of 1932.55 As for Catholic lay organizations, Karl Bachem, his-
torian of the Center Party, remarked in 1931, "Never yet has a Catholic 
country possessed such a developed system of all conceivable Catholic 
associations as today's Catholic Germany. 1156 
This new strength and security was not a total blessing for German 
Catholics, however. As Catholics began to feel more and more like 
Germans, the external threats holding Catholicism together began to 
disappear. During the Kulturkampf the number of Catholics supporting 
the Center was 80 per cent. The party could only rally about 60 per 
cent of the Catholic vote during the Weimar period.57 This decline was 
made more significant by the fact that women voted for the first time 
in 1919 and the Center profited more than other parties from the women's 
franchise.5 8 Parties on the left and right took up the slack. It is 
estimated that in the Reichstag elections in July 1932 more than 2 
million Catholics had voted for the NSDAP. Of the 12.8 million Cath-
olic voters in the elections, the Center and BVP received only 5.2 
million.59 
For their part, the Catholic parties failed to present Catholic 
voters with a single platform. The Bavarian People's Party, founded 
on November 12, 1918 under the proclamation "Bavaria for Bavarians," 
held firmly to its tradition of radical particularism. It never did 
adopt the separation of church and state as stipulated in the Weimar 
Constitution. (The BVP's intransigence allowed the Bavarian government 
to negotiate a separate concordat with Rome in 1924, which made Cath-
olicism a state religion.)60 The Center Party, however, was convinced 
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that the solution to Germany's problems after the war lay in strength-
ening the power of the central government. The party followed a mod-
erate and mediating policy, realizing that the very existence of German 
parliamentary life was threatened by the growth of extremism, whether 
on the right or left. 61 These contrary philosophies naturally led to 
a separation of Center and Bavarian delegates in the Reichstag and 
sent mixed signals to the Catholic populace. 
It was also significant that the German episcopate never went 
so far as to endorse the Catholic parties as the exclusive political 
representatives of Catholicism. John Conway sums up their attitude 
during the Weimar period with the statement: "The suspicion cannot be 
avoided that the German bishops were not wholeheartedly in the defense 
of democracy, or indeed of the maintenance of their political associ-
ates.1162 An explanation must start with the fact that the majority of 
the bishops were deeply distrustful of liberalism and democracy, and 
many remained convinced monarchists. Their average age was slightly 
above 60 and their outlook on politics was shaped by life in Imperial 
Germany. 63 The attitude of Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, head of the 
Munich-Freising archdiocese, was representative of much of the episco-
pate. In a funeral address of 1921 for the last Bavarian king he re-
marked, "Kings by the grace of the people are no grace for the people, 
and where the people are their own King, then sooner or later they also 
become their own gravedigger. 11 64 Before a Katholikentag audience in 
1922, Faulhaber referred to the Revolution as "high treason. 1165 
The bishops were never fully at ease with the policy of the Center 
Party during the Weimar years. They were educated in terms of absolute 
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values themselves, and could not always accept the willingness of the 
Center to compromise~particularly in the area of education. 66 It was 
the coalition of Center and Social Democratic parties and their resolve 
to work together, however, that was most disturbing to the Catholic 
hierarchy. The Spartacist revolt in Berlin in January 1919, the revolu-
tiona.ry dictatorship in Bavaria under Kurt Eisner two months earlier, 
and communist uprisings in German cities from Bavaria to the Baltic 
had left a deep impression on Church leaders. 67 They were well aware 
of the threat that Bolshevism posed to religion and believed that so-
cialism was merely a milder form. 
The fear of revolution and the spread of communism was prominent 
in the Vatican as well. Officials in Rome did not disguise their con-
cern that the chaos of the war had ushered in a new world that might 
prove to be equally chaotic. The collapse of well-established state 
systems and the creation of new states caused the Vatican to actively 
pursue Church interests throughout Europe after the war. Particular 
interest was accorded Germany. Allowing Germany to collapse or remain 
weak would, in the eyes of the Vatican, have dire political, economic, 
and social (as well as religious) consequences on the continent. In 
addition, a strong nation in the middle of Europe was needed to offset 
Russia in the east as well as France in the west. Thus, Germany became 
the linchpin in Vatican policy between the wa.rs.
68 
For its pa.rt Germany needed the support of the Holy See to pre-
vent further dismemberment of the Reich, to forestall Rhineland and 
Catholic South German separatist movements, and to maintain diocesean 
bounda.ries.69 This mutual desire for good relations eventually led to 
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an exchange of diplomatic representatives in 1920. Monsignor Eugenio 
Pacelli, who served in Munich as nuncio to Bavaria since May 1917 (and 
who would become the future Pope Pius XII in March 1939), was named 
the first nuncio to the Reich. Diego von Bergen, a Protestant who 
had represented Prussia as minister to the Holy See since 1919, became 
German ambassador to Rome.70 
A critical transition in Vatican foreign policy occurred in 1922, 
when Pius XI replaced Benedict XV as Pope. Benedict xv, along with 
other Popes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had 
actively supported Catholic political parties. The Popular Party in 
Italy, the Action Franraise in France, and the Center Party in Germany 
all had the blessings of these pontiffs. But Pius XI decided to eschew 
the policy of his predecessors, believing that the end of the war had 
ushered in a totally different world. Not wanting to compromise Church 
interests on anything as ephemeral as a political party, Pius XI dis-
couraged priests from belonging to parties, from supporti~g candidates 
at elections, and from contributing political articles to newspapers. 
Instead of political parties, he put his faith in a lay organization, 
Catholic Action, which would unite Catholics on a religious and moral 
basis.7 1 In a letter to Cardinal Bertram of Breslau, Pius described 
Catholic Action as 
an organization of lay Catholics which, on no other basis 
than that of their religion and loyalty to their bishops and 
the Pope, shall co-ordinate and amplify such Catholic char-
itable, social, moral, educational and religious societies 
as already exist, with the object of applying the principles 
of Christianity as interpreted by t~2catholic Church to 
penetrate the life of the community. 
On the political front Pius XI had the Vatican pursue a vigorous 
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concordat policy to clarify the legal rights and secure the protection 
of the Church. During the interwar period more than forty agreements 
were concluded with foreign states including Poland (1925), Italy 
(1929), Austria (1933), and the German states of Bavaria (1924), 
Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932).73 But the new direction in papal 
policy encouraged the distinction between social and political Cath-
olicism--one that would have fateful consequences for the Catholic 
Church in Germany. 
In retracing the history of German Catholicism prior to 1933, 
a few obvious conclusion can be made. First, the division among German 
Catholics--by region, state, diocese--has been a reflection of the 
character and development of the German nation. Despite these divi-
sions (or more likely because of them) the Church was able to build up 
a solid monastic and educational network and enjoy the benefits of a 
powerful political party and numerous lay organizations. This short 
history has shown above all that the German Catholic Church, supported 
by the Catholic population, has always fought ha.rd to protect its in-
terests, accepting concordats if possible and constitutional guarantees 
when necessary. It should not be surprising, then, that the German 
bishops would focus their response to National Socialism and the Reichs-
konkordat a.round the interests of the Catholic Church. 
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CHAPTER II 
EARLY RESPONSES TO NATIONAL SOCIALig.<I: 
SEPTEMBER 14, 1930 TO MARCH 28, 1933 
It could reasonably be argued that the response of the German 
bishops to events in 1933 was dictated by their response to National 
Socialism. Many other factors certainly entered into the equation, 
but the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on January 30, 1933 and 
his consolidation of power in March of the same year made National 
Socialism the overwhelming concern. Thus, the attitude of the German 
bishops toward the Nazi Party during this period and before adds an 
important dimension to their outlook and response to the Reichskonkor-
!!!1• This chapter will trace the reactions of the bishops from the 
critical Reichstag elections on September 14, 1930, after which the 
bishops imposed their ban on National Socialism, to the eventful proc-
lamation of March 28, 1933, which removed it. The fact that the Nazis 
assumed power without modifying their position on religious matters or 
their behavior toward German Catholics makes their relationship with 
the bishops in these early years especially significant. 
It must be noted that the German bishops were not unaware of the 
Nazi threat prior to September 14, 1930. The implications of Article 
24 of the NSDAP (ad.opted on February 20, 1920) were not lost on the 
German episcopate.1 Two major reasons exist for the failure of the 
bishops to take the Nazi threat seriously before September 1930. First, 
German Catholics were accustomed to, and even expected, threats and 
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abuse from radical elements. It had been their destiny since before 
1870, and they simply took the Nazi attacks as a new variety rather 
than a serious danger. More important perhaps was the fact that the 
NSDAP was not a serious factor in national politics until September 
1930. It received only 2.8 per cent of the vote in the elections of 
May 1928, which marked them as a sectarian group from Bavaria with lit-
tle promise of expansion. However, when the National Socialists gar-
nered 19.2 per cent of the vote in the Katastrophenwa.hlen on September 
14, 1930, it signaled a reorientation of voters and placed the Nazi 
issue in a more serious light.2 In Breslau (Cardinal Bertram's resi-
dence) the Nazi vote jumped from 1.0 to 24.2 per cent between 1928 and 
1930. In the predominantly Catholic town of Regensburg in Bavaria the 
Nazi vote increased from 4.1 to 16 per cent, and in the more rural con-
stituency of Freising (Cardinal Faulhaber's diocese) the increase went 
from 4.9 to 12.2 per cent.3 National Socialism's espousal of "positive 
Christianity" and Alfred Rosenberg's ominous interpretation of it in 
his newly released book,~£!. the Twentieth Century,4 deserved 
serious attention in the face of these numbers. 
An incident in Mainz in November 1930 triggered a crisis for the 
German bishops. A priest from Kirschhausen declared in a sermon that 
Catholics were forbidden to belong to the Nazi Party, that Nazi members 
would not be allowed to attend funerals or other Church functions, and 
that registered members of the Nazi Party would not be admitted to the 
sacraments. This decision caused the Vicar General of Mainz to draft 
similar instructions for the behavior of the rest of his clergy.5 An 
exchange of letters between the Gauleitung of Hesse and Ludwig Maria 
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Hugo, Bishop of Mainz, quickly elevated the incident to a national 
concern. Bishop Hugo stood firmly behind the decision of his Vicar 
General. During the same month, however, Bishop Schreiber of Berlin 
indicated that Catholics were not forbidden to become members of the 
Nazi Party. 6 It was becoming clear that while the bishops agreed that 
a problem existed, there was no uniformity on the way to handle it. 
Cardinal Bertram recognized the need for a united stand and, to-
gether with Archbishop Kaspar Klein of Paderborn, formulated a draft 
statement clarifying the episcopate's position. By December 3 every 
member of the Fulda Bishop's Conference had received a copy and was 
requested to return their comments. Cardinal Faulhaber was presented 
with the same draft and request. This "Breslau initiative" made the 
question of a public or confidential position regarding National Social-
ism acute for the Bavarian bishops. In order to prevent further ids-
uni ty following the Mainz incident, they had delayed issuing pastoral 
instructions. A formal statement by the Fulda bishops, however, would 
force them to take a stand. In a circular letter to the Bavarian epis-
copate, Faulhaber remarked that he personally found the Breslau presen-
tation to be abstract and filled with gaps. It left unanswered the 
question of clerical conduct which was, after all, of primary concern. 
Faulhaber requested the Bavarian bishops to examine the Breslau draft 
and his own outline of clerical instructions and send in their comments 
and recommendations.7 
Many of the replies received by Faulhaber were sharply critical 
of the actions taken in Mainz. While Bishop Johann Leo Mergel of Eich-
statt remarded, ''Mainz has gone too far," Bishop Michael Buchberger of 
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Regensburg called the step of the Vicar General "indefensible and 
entirely inopportune." It is, he continued, "tactically unwise and 
practically impracticable." The Breslau draft also brought out a num-
ber of reservations. Bishop Ow-Felldorf of Passau maintained that it 
was "too exclusively doctrinaire" and did not "give enough instructions 
for pastoral use." Buchberger called it "provisional, neither for 
publication nor studied through enough for instruction to the clergy." 
Bishop Matthias Ehrenfried of Wurzburg said it was "too mild and im-
practical." At the same time Buchberger and Jacob Hauck, Archbishop 
of Bamberg, suggested that a conflicting statement should be avoided 
at all costs since it would be rendered ineffectual. Hauck and Ehren-
fried pleaded for a temporary delay. 
. .. 
Bishop Joseph Kumpfmuller of 
Augsburg questioned the wisdom of a stand so soon after the Mainz deci-
sion. All of these responses reached Faulhaber by December 12.8 In 
a letter to Bertram on December 18 Faulhaber reported that the Bavarian 
episcopate found the Breslau draft, by a narrow majority, to be an in-
adequate public statement.9 
The Bavarian episcopate failed to come up with an alternate draft 
mainly because they could not agree among themselves on the timing or 
contents of a public statement and pastoral instructions. Archbishop 
Hauck of Bamberg argued that any announcement by the episcopate in the 
face of the present enthusiasm over National Socialism would be premai-
ture and fruitless. He felt it wiser to wait for the moment when Nation-
al Socialism showed its true colors in concrete cultural-political ques-
tions, such as with the Reichsschulgesetz. Buchberger worried that with 
communism, socialism, and National Socialism each posing a threat, the 
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Church might simply be overwhelmed by the power and mass of these three 
great movements. On the specific question of admitting uniforms in the 
Church, Hauck, Ehrenfried, and Buchberger were firmly opposed. Faul-
haber, however, rejected participation in Church parades by Nazi groups 
but did not categorically rule out the wearing of uniforms by individ-
1 d · b t· · f" t· 10 ua s urlllg ap isms, marriages, or con irma ions. 
Cardinal Bertram reported the results of his inquiry in a letter 
to Faulhaber and the Fulda bishops on December 17. Only four or five 
members of the Fulda hierarchy-a bare one-third-spoke out in favor 
of an official, common declaration. A day later Bertram received Faul-
haber's letter and the discouraging news from the Bavarian bishops. 
The letter emphasized the need for publishing pastoral instructions 
as well as a public statement and suggested that both the Breslau draft 
statement and the Bavarian instructions could be used since they were 
11 so complementary. 
The silence and indecision among the German bishops came to a 
sudden halt on December 28 when Bertram informed the episcopate of his 
plans to go public with a statement. His address, "Ein offenes Wort 
in ernster Stunde am Jahresschluss 1930, 11 was delivered on December 31. 
This widely publicized statement criticized the one-sided glorification 
of the Nordic race and cautioned Catholics against the ambiguity of 
"positive Christianity" which, Bertram asserted, "cannot have a satis-
factory meaning for us Catholics since everyone interprets it in the 
way he pleases." 12 Although intentionally free of any direct references 
to National Socialism, the address drew immediate censure from the 
Volkischer Beobachter, the official voice of the Nazi Party. Nor was 
Bertram's address popular among his fellow bishops, as Ow-Felldorf's 
comments attest: 
The lack of its official character as a statement of the 
entire episcopate as well as that of any practical instruc-
tions for the clergy over the pastoral handling of ques-
tions has not contributed very much to t~e clarification 
of the entire affair before the public. 
Bertram's intention was to free the episcopate from its dilemma by 
drafting "a statement of broad basis that no one could fix responsi-
bility to and that would allow for further expansion and freedom of 
movement. 111 5 But his "Christmas message" also eliminated any hopes 
for a unified approach to the Nazi question. 
The Bavarian episcopate immediately felt the pressure to issue 
37 
a statement of their own. Ow-Felldorf wrote Faulhaber that the clergy 
was waiting impatiently for authoritative and generally binding instruc-
tions. Kr~pfmuller warned that without some direction members of the 
clergy, in their overzealousness, may follow the Mainz precedent. 16 
After careful deliberation the Bavarian bishops published their declar-
ation on February 12, 1931. In it they denied any intention of passing 
judgment on the political aims of National Socialism, but felt compelled 
to denounce the movement "as long and insofar as it adheres to a relig-
ious and cultural program which is irreconcilable with Catholic teach-
ing.1117 This crucial sentence so concisely summed up the general epis-
copal attitude that it was repeated almost verbatim in the pronounce-
ments from Cologne, Paderborn, and the Upper Rhenish church provinces. 
The Bavarian bishops also issued concrete guidelines for their clergy 
forbidding Catholic priests from taking part in the Nazi movement and 
prohibiting attendence of Nazi formations with flags at Church services. 
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The decision to admit National Socialist members to the sacraments was 
to be decided on an individual basis--each clergy member having to 
distinguish between those Catholics who were mere "fellow-travelers" 
of the Nazi movement and those who were active members with a full 
knowledge of the Party's anti-Catholic orientation.18 
Within a month the remaining church provinces in Germany issued 
statements clarifying their relationship to National Socialism. The 
six bishops of the Cologne privince responded on March 5. Earlier, 
they had adopted a temporizing attitude, hoping that the leaders of 
the Nazi Party would clarify their aims and principles in the aftermath 
of statements by Cardinal Bertram and the Bavarian episcopate, In their 
own statement they explained that a serious warning could no longer be 
delayed, "especially since our policy of waiting and watching the de-
velopment of the National Socialist movement has already been misin-
terpreted.1119 The Cologne bishops, however, took no stand on the Nazi 
Party membership issue or other pastoral problems discussed by their 
Bavarian counterparts. The three bishops of the Paderborn province 
issued their proclamation on March 10 and did rule out Nazi Party mem-
bership for Catholics. For the most part it was an expansion of the 
original December 2 draft statement along with some "trifling" changes.20 
Finally, the three bishops of the Upper Rhenish church province issued 
a declaration on March 19 condemning the anti-Catholic views of National 
Socialism and forbidding Catholics "to acknowledge their adherence to 
21 them by word and deed." 
The opportunity to take a more united stand on the subject of 
National Socialism came when the Fulda bishops convened between August 
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3 and 5, 1931. Cardinal Faulhaber sat in on the proceedings as the 
representative of the Bavarian bishops. The members of the conference 
had before them a set of guidelines adopted in 1921 for clerical deal-
ings with organizations hostile to the Church. They referred back to 
these in fashioning a statement which included the Nazi Party: 
Obviously the foregoing principles a.re to be applied to the 
National Socialist Party, which pretends to be no more than 
a political party with justified national goals, but which 
in fact stands in clearest conflict with fundamental truths 
of Christianity and with the organization of the Catholic 
Church of Christ's founding ••• The issue is not of prounce-
ments and events which determine the character of the party. 
In the2~ace of these, occasional denials a.re of no signifi-cance. 
With this statement National Socialism joined the company of communism, 
socialism, and the Freemasons as movements rejected by the Catholic 
Church. But the same conference also approved the following statement: 
The fight against radicalism, that is against extreme nation-
alism as well as against socialism and communism, should be 
carried out from the standpoint of the faith but not from 
that of partisan politics. In as much as the whole founda-
tion of the faith is called into question, considerations 
of what is possible or useful for the moment must yield. 
µaerite2~rimum regum ~ (Seek first of all the kingdom of God). 
Taken together, these statements support the policy of treating polit-
ical and religious-cultural questions in isolation from each other. 
The failure to recognize their interdependence, particularly when con-
stitutional guarantees became meaningless, would cost the bishops in 
the future. 
The concerns of the bishops about the Nazi threat were also re-
fleeted in pastoral letters and messages prior to the July 1932 elec-
tions. A statement issued by the Prussian bishops on July 12 was rep-
resentative of the pre-election advice. It stressed the importance of 
the upcoming elections and urged Catholics to elect representatives 
whose character and proven attitudes give evidence for their 
stand on questions of peace and welfare for the people, pro-
tection of the confessional schools, the Christian religion, 
and the Catholic Church. Beware of agitators and p~ties 
that are not worthy of the confidence of Catholics. 
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As usual, the bishops refrained from supporting any candidate or party, 
but their allusion to the National Socialists as a party to avoid 
could hardly be missed.25 Their warning was not heeded, however. 
The combined vote for the two Catholic parties in the July 1932 elec-
tion represented less than one-half cf the Catholic vote of almost 13 
million.26 The Center and BVP had still managed to increase their 
percentage of the total vote by 9 per cent over the September 1930 
election and their total number of mandates by 10.27 But the National 
Socialists more than doubled their representation over the same period. 
Polling 37.4 per cent of the popular vote in July, they elected 230 
deputies to the Reichstag and became the largest single party in Ger-
28 many. 
The Fulda Bishop's Conference was convened between August 17 and 
19, on the heels of the Nazi election victory. By this time membership 
in the Nazi Party had been prohibited in all the dioceses. The increas-
ing pressures on the bishops to reconsider their position forced them 
to adopt a clarifying statement. Their resolution justified the ban on 
National Socialism because "parts of its official program contain false 
teachings" and "because statements by countless leading representatives 
and publicists of the Party are hostile to the Faith." Moreover, "these 
statements have never been refuted or criticized by the supreme leader-
ship of the Party." The bishops declared it inexcusable that large 
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numbers of Catholics were joining the Nazi Party for economic or polit-
ical reasons, arguing that "support for the Party necessarily involves, 
whether one wants it or not, furthering its aims as a whole." They 
included in their statement the ominous warning, "if the Party were 
to gain the momopoly of power in Germany which it is so hotly pursuing, 
the prospects for the Church interests of the Catholics would be gloomy 
indeed.29 
The Fulda bishops recognized the difficulties involved in formu-
lating feasible pastoral instructions, and thus followed the Bavarian 
example of allowing greater flexibility in the field. They did sug-
gest some broad guidelines for the clergy: 
The individual pastor must exercise his discretion as to wheth-
er, in a particular case, paid-up membership in the Party can 
be excused, providing it does not involve any specific promo-
tion of its cultural aims or any participation in its propa-
ganda. It may, for example, be excusable as an erroneous 
view adopted in all innocence, or under the influence of a 
sort of mass psychosis, because of terrorist intimid~0ion, or because a refusal might have fateful consequences ••• 
These guidelines were a clear attempt by the episcopate to appease the 
growing multitudes of German Catholics in late 1932 who, as Rudolf 
Iforsey pointed out, were "on the path to the Right. 1131 
While German Catholics generally supported the episcopal stand 
during this period, it should not be forgotten that opposition to Na-
tional Socialism did not include the entire population of German Cath-
olics. Not only was collaboration with Hitler gradually increasing 
among Catholics on the Right, there was also a growing tendency within 
the two Catholic parties to seek a working relationship with the Nazis. 
After the dismissal of Brtming on May 30, 1932, for example, leaders 
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of the Center Party started negotiations with the Nazis in hopes of 
forming a coalition government. The talks began on August 13 and con-
tinued for weeks, causing surprise and confusion within much of the 
Catholic community.32 The move also undercut the authority of the 
bishops, who had been preaching against the heresies of the Nazi move-
ment for the past two yea.rs. The Center Party continued to negotiate 
with the Nazis in August, September, and November of 1932, believing 
they could tame their prospective associates.33 Even the Catholic 
press, normally energetic in its support of the Church, tempered its 
opposition to National Socialism over time. This change in policy was 
the result of relentless harassment and acts of terror on the pa.rt of 
the Nazis. 34 
The Vatican followed the situation in Germany closely during this 
period. Its statements and actions suggest that, over time, it too 
became more accommodating to the Nazi position than the German bishops. 
Two months after the Mainz incident the Osservatore Roma.no, unofficial 
voice of the Vatican, delivered a sharp attack on National Socialist 
philosophy. The statement was made on January 21, 1931, shortly before 
the Bavarian declaration, and emphasized that Church authorities in 
Mainz were rebelling "not against the political goals and interests 
that they ~ational Socialists] strive for or represent, but rather 
against the principles contained in their program which a.re irreconcil-
able with Catholic teaching."35 The British Charge d'Affaires to the 
Holy See had earlier written his Foreign Office, "Cardinal Pacelli was 
at pains to point out to me that the Bishop of Mainz was acting on his 
own initiative. 11 36 In March 1931 Pius XI gave an address in Rome which 
criticized the arbitrary application of Christian ideas. Otto von 
Ritter, Bavarian Ambassador to the Vatican, covered the main points 
in his report on :March 17: 
German National Socialism can certainly apply here, although 
they have not been expressly referred to in this relationship 
by the Pope •••• It was considered judicious by the Pope, after 
the comments already published by the German bishops, to tem-
porarily leave this question alone. But he certainly also had 
National Socialism in mind in his address and his warning was 
perhaps even directed to them above all. For the Vatican pur-
sues, as I have already reported in other places, with no mis-
taken anxiety t37 threats of National Socialism to religion 
and the Church. 
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In early I>'iay 1931 Hitler sent Goring to Rome to ease the tensions 
among German Catholics and to present the goals of his party to the 
Cardinal Secretary of State. Not wanting to bestow recognition on the 
Nazi Party at the expense of the German bishops, Pius XI had Under Sec-
retary of State Monsignore Giuseppe Pizzardo meet with Goring in place 
of Pacelli. Ritter's report to Nunich on May 11 notes, "The Vatican 
intention in this matter, as I have learned in strict confidence, is 
to ••• leave the German bishops free reign in the development of mat-
ters.1138 After an audience with the Pope in December 1931, Ritter 
quoted the Pontiff as saying that the "widespread anti-Christian prin-
ciples11 of National Socialism and the Party's "inability to come to an 
agreement with the bishops in Germany" would make it "very difficult, 
if not impossible to form a coalition with them." Nevertheless, the 
Pope admitted that "a temporary working relationship is perhaps possible 
for the distinct purpose of preventing a still greater evil."39 
These reports by Ritter conceal the diplomatic machinations already 
at work within the Vatican. In August 1931, not quite three months af-
ter G~ring's visit to Rome, Pacelli met with Br~ning in the Vatican and 
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pressured the Chancellor to form a coalition with the Nazis. Br~ning's 
firm refusal temporarily ended discussion of the matter.4° However, a 
report sent to Rome on January 4, 1932 by the Italian Ambassador to 
Berlin, Orsini-Baroni, points out a persistent interest on the part of 
the Vatican. The report claims that Brt'.Uiing had received advice from 
the Vatican through Monsignore Kaas that he should work toward an under-
standing with Hitler.41 Vatican intentions were also bared in the 
spring of 1932 with the appointment of a new archbishop in .Freiburg. 
Instead of confirming a choice by the archdiocese of .Freiburg, a cus-
tom in effect for a hundred years, the Vatican appointed Dr. Mathias 
Grober, a man not wanted by the .Freiburg diocese. Gr8ber made a re-
vealing initial speech to the clergy of his diocese, declaring that 
the Church must gradually assume a more conciliatory and more "prudent" 
attitude toward National Socialism. It must, as Grober put it, "put 
on the brakes. 1142 
When Hitler was appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg on 
January 30, 1933, the German bishops remained steadfast in their re-
jection of National Socialism. Cardinal Faulhaber spoke for the feel-
ings of the majority of the episcopate when he declared in a pastoral 
letter on February 10 that the principles of Christian political science 
do not change as governments change.43 But Hitler's position as the 
legal head of the German government placed the bishops in an uncomf ort-
able situation. Catholic political theory held that while God is the 
source of all political authority, the agency to exercise that authority 
is designated by the people. Despite reservations at times, the Church 
has historically adapted itself to all types of political regimes as 
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long as guarantees to family, property, and Church were honored.44 The 
German bishops obviously believed that National Socialism did not meet 
these qualifications, but they had extreme difficulty in convincing many 
German Catholics.45 What started out to be a repudiation of the Nazi 
Party became, in the eyes of many Catholics, a rejection of the legal 
government. Interestingly enough, when the ban was finally lifted 
these same people were quick to read into it a recommendation of Nation-
al Socialism. 
Catholic leaders were deeply concerned during the month of Feb-
ruary about the Reichstag elections set by Hitler for Harch 5. In the 
weeks prior to the election the Catholic parties faced constant persecu-
tion--election headquarters and newspaper offices were sacked, meetings 
were prohibited, posters confiscated, and Catholic civil servants dis-
missed. Rudolf Morsey affirms: "From the middle of February on a con-
centrated wave of National Socialist terror spread over the Center 
Pa.rty. 1146 Writing to members of the Fulda Bishop's Conference on Feb-
ruary 11, Cardinal Bertram recommended an episcopal statement before 
election day. "Unpleasant as it is to publish a pastoral letter deal-
ing with political elections," he wrote, "I find weighty reasons to sat-
isfy the expectations of the people who a.re face to face with atheism, 
the danger of Kulturkampf, and systematic attempts at terror and decep-
tion.1147 Bertram's draft received the support of the Fulda bishops and 
was published on February 20. Almost identical to the statements issued 
before the elections of July and November 1932, it encouraged Catholics 
to vote for representatives "whose proven character and proven atti-
tudes" reflect a concern for the rights of the Church, and to be aware 
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of "agitators and parties not worthy of the confidence of Catholics. 1148 
Confusion about where Nazi Party representatives stood caused several 
bishops to issue clarifying statements. Bishop Kaller of Ermland, for 
example, instructed his diocese on February 25: 
Although National Socialism displays certain attractive fea-
tures and raises many legitimate claims, we must refuse to 
support it as long as it adheres to those princip~9s which 
the German bishops have rejected as being heresy. 
The elections on Harch 5 took place amid an atmosphere of propa-
ganda and terror.5° While the Nazi Party still failed to win an out-
right majority, receiving only 43.9 per cent of the votes cast, they 
did enjoy the advantage of a majority coalition with the German Nation-
alists. The Catholic parties held their own, although the Bavarian 
People's Party suffered some considerable losses.51 The election re-
sults had two significant consequences for the Catholic Church in Ger-
many. First, the Center Party had lost its decisive position in the 
Reichstag and was no longer able to protect the interests of the Church. 
Second, the Nazi Party secured the legal machinery of state to threaten 
those interests. The combination was to prove fatal to the Catholic 
parties and painful to the Church. 
Pressures on the German episcopate were compounded in the weeks 
following the elections. Many Catholics were counted among the ''March 
casual ties," those who willingly joined the Nazi Party. 52 The whole-
sale dismissal of Catholic civil servants, the uncertain position of 
numerous Catholic organizations, and the urgent requests by the clergy 
for instructions added to the pressure.53 The bishops were also con-
cerned about the Gleichschaltung of the Lander governments. In the two 
weeks following the elections, Reich Commissioners had replaced the 
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. " legally constituted governments in Wurttemburg, Baden, Bremen, Hamburg, 
Lubeck, Saxony, Hessen, and Bava.ria.54 Bertram wrote President Hinden-
burg on March 10 declaring, "The hour has come when we must turn to the 
Reich President with the urgent request for protection for the Church 
and church life and activities. 1155 Archbishop Grober expressed his 
written concern to Pacelli on March 18 that growing numbers of Catholics 
were moving over to the Nazi Party in the midst of what appeared to be 
another Kulturkampf .56 Faulhaber expressed the same concern to the 
Ca.rdinal Secretary of State ten days later, writing: "Many bishops are 
greatly concerned that we are on the verge of a powerful Kulturkampf 
against the Catholic Church. "57 
The pressure on the bishops to withdraw their ban did not always 
take the form of terror or harassment. At this early stage Hitler had 
no intentions of a direct confrontation with the Catholic Church. Be-
fore coming to power he had remarked to his friend, Arthur Dintner, 
"Do not imagine that I shall commit Bismarck's mistake. He was a Prot-
estant and did not know how to handle the Catholic Church. Providence 
has made me born Catholic. I know how to. 1158 The subtleness of Hit-
ler's methods was described to Pacelli in a letter from Faulhaber on 
Narch 28. The Cardinal recounted an official radio report on the eve-
ning of Narch 21 which explained that the Chancellor and Reichsminister 
Goebbels would not participate in Church services because 
the Catholic bishops of Germany have, in a series of explana-
tions in the recent past, designated the leader and members of 
the National Socialist Party renegades of the Church. They 
will not be allowed to partake of the sacr~9nts. To date 
these explanations have not been withdrawn. 
Hitler was also careful to cultivate Catholic religious interests while 
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at the same time attacking "political Catholicism." On February 22 
the Prussian government decreed the gradual abolition of the interdenom-
inational schools and reintroduced religious education in the vocational 
schools. 60 A law announced on February 27 recognized seven Catholic 
feast days as legal holidays.61 
The passage of the Enabling Act on March 23 confirmed the inabil-
ity of the Catholic parties to protect the Church and was another factor 
in the decision by the bishops to retract their ban. Hitler's plans 
for the Enabling Act were ta.ken up in the March 7 cabinet meeting. 
Goring stressed the necessity of winning over the Center Party since 
passage of the act required a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag. 
Papen then reported on a conversation he had a day earlier with Ludwig 
Kaas, Chairman of the Center Party. According to von Papen, Kaas ex-
plained "that he was without the earlier close contact of his party and 
was no longer ready to follow the course of the past." Reportedly, 
Kaas also offered von Papen the cooperation of the Center. 62 Whether 
for this or other reasons, the confidence in Nazi circles that the Center 
Party would approve the law was great from the beginning. 63 
Hitler and Wilhelm Frick, M.inister of the Interior, met with Cen-
ter leaders Kaas, Adam Stegerwald, and Albert Hackelsberger between 
Karch 20 and 22 to discuss the conditions under which the Center Party 
delegates would vote for the law. .Among the demands which Hitler agreed 
to were promises to maintain the existence of the German states, to not 
use the new power to change the constitution, to retain civil servants 
belonging to the Center Party, to protect confessional schools, and to 
respect the state concordats. Hitler also agreed to mention these 
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promises in a radio address to be broadcast on March 23, the day of 
the vote. 64 Following Hitler's radio address, the Center and Bavarian 
People's parties cast their most decisive votes ever in the Reichstag. 
In the weeks prior to Earch 28 there were numerous signs that 
the Vatican and the German episcopate did not see eye to eye on the 
Nazi situation. .An article in .!!! Corrispondenza in Rome on March 13 
claimed that a positive change would take place in the attitude of the 
German bishops and the Center vis-a-vis National Socialism which would 
lead to further developments. The Catholic paper, L' Avvenire d'Italia, 
reported from Rome on Karch 17 that the desire exists in the Vatican 
for the German bishops to work together with the government. The cor-
respondent in Rome for~ Temps reported on March 16 that a turn in 
the Vatican toward friendly relations with Hitler was imminent. 65 More 
concrete evidence was provided by Cardinal Faulhaber on his ad-Limina 
visit to Rome between March 9 and 17. During an audience with the Pope, 
Faulhaber was apprised that Hitler was "the first statesman that had 
spoken out against Bolshevism.1166 In an address before the Consistor-
ium on March 13, Pius XI heaped indirect praise on the new German gov-
ernment for the same reason. After returning to Germany Faulhaber re-
ported to the Bavarian episcopate that for reasons he "could not commu-· 
nicate here" but "had been through with the highest officials in Rome," 
they ~he bishop::] were, "in spite of everything, to practice more tol-
erance against the new government. 1167 The correlation between the pro-
ceedings in Rome and the later decisions in Germany was made by Faulhaber 
in a report at the Bavarian Bishop's Conference on April 20: 
A declaration [}y the bishops] was essential and our situation 
through the behavior of Rome tragic. }ly Rome trip confirmed 
to me what we already long suspected. In Rome they judged 
National Socialism like FS§cism as the only deliverance from 
Communism and Bolshevism. 
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Huch has been written about the March 28 declaration in an effort 
to explain why the German bishops changed their minds so quickly and 
acted in such haste. Extensive treatment has also been given to the 
contents of the statement itself~What did the bishops actually say? 
Did they really mean to say what everyone thought they had? Finally, 
the consequences of the statement for the German populace has been thor-
oughly analyzed. 69 Still, the absence of the Vatican documents and the 
silence of some key individuals has failed to close the chapter on this 
event. In fact, the March 28 declaration is today the focus of a more 
complex question: Was there a conscious relationship between it, the 
::2:!nabling Act, and the beginning of the Reichskonkordat negotiations?70 
We have a relatively clear idea of the deliberations of the Ger-
man episcopate in their correspondence leading up to and following March 
28. The abruptness of their change in attitude and the urgency with 
which it was made public a.re especially evident. In a letter to the 
Fulda bishops on March 19 Bertram inquired whether the time had come 
for a revision of the Church's attitude toward National Socialism. His 
own view was that "the situation was not sufficiently clear" to issue 
a common statement and that "the change in political conditions cannot 
be the occasion to revise an opinion resolved on Church principles. 1171 
In the same letter he mentioned a visit by von Papen on the previous 
day (March 18) in which the Vice Chancellor asked him whether the Church 
would revise its stand on National Socialism. "I pointed out," wrote 
Bertram, "that any revising must be done by the leader of National 
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Socialism himself ."72 Several bishops expressed their desire for an 
immediate general statement, however.73 Archbishop Grober wrote Bertram 
on }larch 22: 
As far as a common declaration to the Catholic people is con-
cerned, an urgent demand for one by us in the south is con-
firmed. Nany circles have already approached me •••• I beg74 your eminence to take this into consideration once again. 
Hitler's address to the German people on March 23 (the same day 
as the .L:nabling Act) appears to be the pivotal cause for the sudden 
shift in the bishops' attitude. Almost everything that the Church held 
closest to its heart Hitler promised: 
The national government regards the two Christian confessions 
as the weightiest factors for the maintenance of our nation-
ality. They will respect the agreements concluded between 
them and the federal states. Their rights are not to be in-
fringed •••• The national government will allow and secure to 
the Christian confessions the influence which is their due 
both in the school and in education •••• The government of the 
Reich, who regard Christianity as the unshakeable foundation 
of the morals and the moral code of the nation, attach the 
greatest value to friendly relatt~ns with the Holy See and 
are endeavoring to develop them. 
Bertram sent a circular to members of the episcopate the next day, 
remarking that Hitler's policy speech made the various drafts in re-
sponse to his Earch 19 letter "out of date." He argued that "a public 
proclamation is now definitely advisable" and that it would be "espe-
cially effective if it can be issued in the next few days. 1176 A draft 
resolution was enclosed along with the request that comments and sug-
gestions be forwarded immediately. In a letter to the Bavarian epis-
copate on the same day, Faulhaber confirmed that the recent cla.rifica-
tion by the Chancellor had created a new situation. He also noted that 
because of the demand by the clergy for clear instructions, the bishops 
could no longer wait to determine the position of the new governments 
(both state and national) toward the Church.77 Bertram expanded on 
the reasons which necessitated a change in attitude toward National 
Socialism in another circular to the episcopate on March 25: 
1. Waiting to see if the generous promises of the government, 
as outlined in the Chancellor's policy speech, a.re real-
ized can take years •••• Nothing could be worse than that. 
2. In the big Catholic cities, where closed formations of 
the SA a.re not presently admitted to Catholic services, 
church attendance is ma.de mandatory by command of the 
leaders. The result is that Catholic me,gers of the SA 
flock full-force to Protestant churches. 
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On March 27 Bertram informed the episcopate that members of the 
Fulda Bishop's Conference had, by vote, settled on a final statement. 
He added that discussion of every individual draft formulation sent in 
would cause too much of a correspondence delay to be feasible. Besides, 
a large number of bishops "requested him not to wait an hour longer." 
Bertram also apologized to the Bavarian episcopate for not being suf-
ficiently aware of the special conditions in their dioceses.79 The 
Bavarian bishops were understandably upset, but Faulhaber telegraphed 
Bishops Preysing, Ow-Felldorf, Buchberger, and Sebastian on :March 28 
that he had given his assent to Bertram's draft "for the sake of unity 
among the bishops and within the pastoral ranks. 1180 Thus, the declara-
tion published on March 28 appeared to represent the consensus of the 
entire German episcopate. 
The text began by stating that over the past few years the Ger-
man bishops had adopted a disapproving attitude toward the National 
Socialist movement out of their concern for the purity of Catholic 
faith and the preservation of the vital interests and rights of the 
Church. Their prohibitions and warnings were to have remained in effect 
as long and insofar as the reasons prompting them existed. The text 
then reads: 
It has now to be recognized that in solemn, public pronounce-
ments by the supreme representative of the Reich government, 
who at the same time is the authoritative leader of that 
movement, account was taken of the inviolability of Catholic 
doctrine and of the immutable obligations and rights of the 
Church. Moreover, the Reich government expressly recognized 
the complete validity of the concordats made between the 
Church and the individual German provinces. Without there-
fore departing from the condemnation of certain religious 
and moral errors voiced in our earlier measures, the episco-
pate believes it has ground for confidence that the general 
prohibitions and warn~s mentioned above need no longer be 
regarded as necessary. 
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A sentence of greater impact and intent appears later in the declara-
tion: 
Catholic Christians, for whom the voice of their Church is 
holy, have no need, even at the present time, for any special 
exhortation to be loyal to the legal authorities, to carry 
out their civic duties conscientiously, or to reject as a82 matter of principle all illegal or subversive activities. 
Did the bishops believe that a withdrawal of their ban would at 
the same time signal a recommendation of National Socialism? :Bertram 
certainly did not think so. 
ti In a letter to Grober on March 27, the 
same day the draft was completed, he wrote, "Your friendly remarks to 
the declaration arrived just after the sending of the final completed 
draft. I, also have the feeling ••• that it can scarcely be taken as a 
document of political approval. 1183 An unsigned and undated statement, 
prepared confidentially for use by the Catholic press, has been found 
among Gr~ber's literary remains. It shows a concern for false inter-
pretations which might ensue following the publication of the declara-
tion: 
Because the statement of the episcopate, as soon as the af-
fairs of public life warrant, can be interpreted in many ways 
by political party organs which correspond in no way to the 
intentions of the authors, it should be most humbly stated ••• 
that the declaration of March 28 is ~4no wey an absolute recommendation of National Socialism. 
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Faulhaber had no illusions about the significance or impact of 
the declaration. In a letter to Bishop Kasper Klein of Paderborn on 
Earch 29, he expressed his fears that it would have a particularly 
crushing impact on those Catholics most faithful to the Center and 
Bavarian People's parties. At the same time, he conceded that this 
step was necessary "for the larger Catholic cause. 1185 Faulhaber wrote 
Austrian Bishop Johannes Gfollner on April 3 that a number of reasons 
had entered into the episcopate's decision. Among them was the belief 
that the Holy Father's public praise of Hitler was at the same time a 
criticisr.i of their ban. He added that 
the bishops a.re now experiencing the tragedy that they a.re 
distrusted and under suspicion because they change their 
mind in deference to the higher questions of life outlined 
in Rorae and must re~~in silent concerning the deeper motives 
of their statement. 
Without question the }~arch 28 declaration represented a sharp 
reversal of the episcopate's earlier position on r~ational Socialism. 
Simply summarized, a ban had been placed on the Nazi Party in early 
1931, consistently sustained over a two-year period, and suddenly 
withdrawn in Narch 1933. What took four months of deliberation to 
establish was removed in less than four days. The J<iarch 28 decla.ra-
tion, together with the Enabling Act, ushered in yet another change 
in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the German state 
(rapidly becoming the Nazi state). It also made a Reichskonkordat 
agreement, in the planning stages since 1920, at once more pressing 
and feasible. Until the conclusion of the Reichskonkordat the bishops 
would become mostly spectators as the Vatican and Nazi government 
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARD A REICHSKONKORDAT AGREEMENT: 
MARCH 28, 1933 TO JULY 20, 1933 
It is easy to gain the impression that the Reichskonkordat was 
strictly a product of the Nazi era and was limited in its significance 
to 1933. Such an impression is easily made by the fact that scholars 
themselves disagree on the question of continuity of negotiations be-
tween Weimar and Nazi periods.1 But the Reichskonkordat was clearly 
the culmination of thirteen yea.rs of effort (however futile prior to 
1933) and failing to consider it in its entirety gives a narrow focus 
to a complicated situation. That many of the key personalities were 
involved in both periods of negotiation by itself justifies a brief 
survey of development. 
A concordat covering all Germany had never been probable in a 
situation where individual states retained the right to deal with re-
ligious bodies and regulate church-state affairs within their borders.2 
The Constitution of 1871, in fact, left religious matters entirely in 
the hands of the Lander, which made any general concordat impossible. 
Article 10 of the Weimar Constitution, however, gave the Reich govern-
ment the right to legislate important principles in the areas of relig-
ion and education. The centralizing tendencies and expanded powers of 
the new Weimar government thus made a Reichskonkordat at least theoret-
ically possible.3 More important, both the Reich government and the 
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Vatican supported the idea of such a concordat in the early Weimar 
yea.rs. Favorable relations with the Holy See were valued by Germany 
at this time for both foreign and domestic reasons. For the German 
government, signing an agreement which would make concessions on in-
ternal issues was a desirable tradeoff for Vatican support in inter-
national affairs. On its part the Vatican was following a policy of 
legally defining relationships with states newly-created by the war and 
redefining relationships with others altered by the war. As we have 
already seen, the Vatican was deeply fearful of the radical Left (in-
cluding liberals) and the prospect of a secularized society marked by 
a separation of Church and State. It also feared the breaking up of 
confessional schools and an end of state support for the churches. A 
high priority was placed on concluding an agreement with Germany. 
Reichskonkordat negotiations immediately became complicated in 
January 1920 when Bavaria began to negotiate its own treaty with Rome. 
The Bavarian government, as well as the Bavarian episcopate, had always 
viewed their concordat with Rome (1817) as a symbol of their unique 
status among states of the Reich. While the Weimar Constitution re-
tracted from Bavaria all of the special privileges granted them at the 
time of unification (their own army, postal service, etc.), Article 78 
did open the door to relations with the Vatican.5 Officials in Rome 
did not discourage the overture, believing that a predominantly Catholic 
state like Bavaria was likely to present fewer difficulties and make 
greater concessions to the Church. Thus, Pacelli, representing the 
Holy See in both state and Reich negotiations, informed Richard Delbr~ck, 
head of the Vatican desk at the Foreign Office, that the Bavarian accord 
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might not only be signed first, but might also be a model for future 
concordats. 6 Reich officials were understandably concerned. Concordat 
legislation in Bavaria, where the Church was influential and able to 
exert pressure on the government for concessions, would never be ap-
proved in a general treaty by the Reichsrat, the legislative body in 
Germany representing all the states. Prussian Minister President, 
Adam Stegerwald, who was himself a Catholic, declared that the school 
issue would never pass the Prussian Landtag, given its composition of 
large numbers of Social Democrats and parties dominated by conservative 
Protestants.? 
The Reich government persisted in its efforts to secure a com-
prehensive agreement and, in January 1921, circulated a list of its 
general negotiating points to the individual states for comment. By 
the end of January Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse, Saxony, and W~rttemberg-
all states with sizable Catholic populations--gave negative replies. 
All feared that a Reichskonkordat would overshadow their authority over 
religious and educational matters. 8 The greatest resistance came from 
Prussia and Bavaria. Prussia held firmly to the position that it would 
approve a Reichskonkordat only if it were valid for all Germany and if 
it would supercede all state concordats. Bavaria insisted that its 
concordat would be an international, bilateral treaty which would be 
constitutionally valid and could not be superceded.9 
In addition to the particularist sentiment of the states, the 
ambiguity of the Reich Constitution was itself an obstacle in the way 
of a Reichskonkordat. The Constitution had not adequately clarified 
the guarantees and rights of the Church or the extent and limits of 
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control of the central government.10 Thus, the competencies of the 
two levels of government remained unclear throughout the Weimar period. 
Failure to pass a Reich school law, a critical precondition for negot-
iating with the Vatican, was largely the result of this constitutional 
ambiguity. (The Center and Social Democrats were also in fundamental 
disagreement on what the law should contain.) 
By mid-1922, almost three yea.rs after the idea of a Reichskonkor-
~ appeared, negotiations were deadlocked in the beginning stage. 
Without a school law and clarification of constitutional questions of 
competence, Berlin had to allow the Lander to negotiate first. The 
conclusion of a concordat with Bavaria in 1924 ma.de a comprehensive 
treaty even more difficult. By this time external questions were also 
less pressing for the Reich government. Still, Pacelli's move to Berlin 
as Papal Nuncio in 1925 (he transferred his residence from Munich) kept 
the issue alive, and simultaneous negotiations were soon being conducted 
with Prussia and the Reich. More than a dozen drafts and return drafts 
of a Reichskonkordat text existed by 1926, when talks with the Reich 
government once again bogged down. 11 They appeared buried for good 
when the Prussian government signed its treaty with the Vatican in 1929. 
A major problem lying outside the jurisdiction of the Lander con-
cordats soon opened the door for further Reichskonkordat discussions. 
The issue of pastoral ca.re in the armed forces of the Reich (the Reichs-
~)had been a topic of discussion since 1921. Military chaplains 
were without regular parishes and had always been responsible to the 
local clergy and bishops. Pressured by the Ministry of Defense, the 
Reich government had been seeking the appointment of an army bishop 
who would take over these responsibilities and who would have exempt 
status from the German bishops. 12 In March 1930 Monsignor Kaas, who 
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was actively involved in concordat diplomacy throughout the Weimar per-
iod, 13 informed Pacelli, now Papal Secretary of State, of the Reich's 
wishes. Pacelli expressed a willingness to grant the Reich an exempt 
army bishop if the government would accept certain Church demands. 
These were placed before the Foreign Ministry in a memorandum on April 
23, 1931 and included a promise that financial subsidies to the Church 
would not be terminated without prior agreement with the Holy See, a 
guarantee of the rights of Catholics concerning confessional schools 
and religious instruction in state schools, and changes in the marriage 
law. 14 C.hancellor Bruning assured Pacelli that a Reichskonkordat con-
taining such language would never survive a Reichstag vote. The com-
munists would vote against it as well as many Socialists, liberals, and 
members of the extreme Right. 15 A further condition was set by the Vat-
ican in a pro memoria on October 25, 1932. It demanded that in case of 
a change in the constitution or laws of the Reich, the rights of the 
Church recognized in the Lander concordats would not be impaired. Von 
Papen, who was now Chancellor, responded favorably to these demands 
"for reasons of domestic politics" and encouraged further dialogue. 16 
But Church demands were still beyond the competency of the Reich 
to meet, despite its willingness at both the beginning and end of the 
Weimar period. Failure to conclude a Reichskonkordat resulted from 
such intricate problems as particularism versus centralism, constitu-
tional uncertainties, and irreconcilable differences~both philosophical 
and political~on the question of the Church's role in society and in 
educational affairs. Hitler's rise to and consolidation of power 
eliminated all of these obstacles. Fritz Menshausen, a Counselor at 
the Foreign Office, summed up the new state of affairs in an April 5 
memorandum: 
The situation has been completely altered by the new com-
position of the Reichstag and especially by the passage of 
the Enabling Act. There now exists the possibility to comply 
fully with the wishes of the Holy See without also involving 
the Reichstag. Above all it is now possible to conclude a 
Reichskonkordat, the realization of which until now had 18 always failed because of the objection of the Reichstag. 
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For the Vatican, which had the upper hand throughout the Weimar 
period, this new state of affairs made the long-coveted Reichskonkordat 
not only possible, but urgently necessary. The emergency powers that 
Hitler was able to acquire from Reich President Hindenburg on February 
28 and later from the Reichstag in the Enabling Act were a two-edged 
sword. While they removed the Reichstag as a major obstacle to the 
conclusion of a treaty, they also allowed Hitler to suspend at will 
a constitution which provided guarantees of freedom of religion and 
placed the status of the Lander concordats in serious jeopardy.19 If 
the Vatican wished to secure legal protections and guarantees for the 
Church, Hitler's principal motivation for a Reichskonkordat with Rome 
was his desire to eliminate the Catholic clergy from party politics. 
This desire can be traced to his early fascination with the Italian 
Concordat of 1929--in particular Article 43 Section 2 which legally 
restricted the clergy from politics.20 Hitler's offer to negotiate 
a treaty, carried to Rome by von Papen in early April, was based on 
Vatican acceptance of this article.21 
The genesis of Reichskonkordat negotiations in the Nazi era is 
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still very much a mystery--and still very much debated.22 The activity 
of von Papen and Kaas, very prominent once official discussions com-
menced, is also unclear in the developing stages. Both appear to be 
positioned in all of the right places at the right times, however.23 
What is clear is that von Papen's trip to Rome triggered official ne-
gotiations with the Vatican and that these negotiations fell into three 
distinct periods. The first took place between April 10 and 18, en-
compassing the Vice Chancellor's stay at the Vatican. The second per-
iod lasted from April 20 to June 28 and consisted of a long period of 
correspondence between von Papen and Kaas, the unofficial intermediary 
between Pacelli and von Papen. The final stage began with von Papen's 
return to Rome on June 28 and ended with the initialing of the pact on 
July 8. The formal signing took place on July 20 and ratification fol-
lowed two months later on September 10.24 
A brief survey of the proceedings during these periods will pro-
vide a framework from which to consider the response of the episcopate. 
Pacelli and von Papen first met on April 10 and reached fundamental 
agreement on their desire for a concordat. A second meeting was set 
for April 15, giving von Papen and Kaas time to formulate the major 
issues. All three met on April 15 and discussed articles dealing with 
an oath of allegience to the State, prayers for the State, an exempt 
military chaplaincy, protection for Catholic organizations, and the de-
politicizing of the clergy. Kaas was selected to put together a draft, 
which he completed by April 18. Since von Papen had returned to Berlin 
on the same day, the draft was mailed to the German capital. The re-
sults of this first round are truly amazing when one considers that 
two yea.rs passed before initial drafts of the Prussian and Austrian 
concordats were fashioned. 25 
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Hitler's wish to eliminate the clergy from politics (Article 31 
at this point) was the dominant subject in the long period of corres-
pondence between von Papen and Kaas. After discussing Kaas' initial 
draft formulation of Article 31 with Hitler (it restricted the clergy 
to the same rules as parliamentary candidates), von Papen wrote Kaas 
on April 26 that it "was in no way sufficient."26 On May 11 Kaas sent 
von Papen a revision of the article wherein the political activity of 
the clergy would have to be approved by the bishops, and then "only in 
rare cases where Church interest was especially substantiated. 1127 Von 
Papen, again under instructions from Hitler, informed Kaas on May 17 
that every public political function of the clergy must be categori-
cally forbidden and that Article 31 was "a condi tio sine gua E.2!!" for 
a Reichskonkordat.28 Diego von Bergen, German Ambassador to the Holy 
See, made it clear on June 16 that von Papen's return to Rome for final 
negotiations would be based on the expectation that this demand would 
be granted. 29 
The new formulation of Articles 31 and 32 that von Papen brought 
to Rome on June 28 (the latter dealt with the regulation and protection 
of Catholic organizations. The two articles would be reversed before 
the initialing of the treaty) reflected the progress of the Gleich-
schaltung in Germany. Kaas remarked to Pacelli that "they a.re extra-
ordinarily harsh"30 and Father Robert Leiber, secretary and close friend 
of Pacelli, remarked that the Reich draft was more restrictive than 
Article 43 of the Italian Concordat.31 Still, agreement on the final 
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text was reached in four sessions taking place over three days--Fridccy-
June 30 through Sunday July 2. Pacelli, von Papen, Kaas, and Bergen 
were present throughout. Archbishop Gr8ber, representing the German 
bishops, was present from July 1 on and attended the final three ses-
sions.32 In sessions on July 1 and 2 the Vatican consented to a pro-
hibition of clerical activity..!!! political parties. By July 8 it was 
forced to accept the prohibition of clerical activity f.2E. political 
parties )3 
As this brief survey indicates, the German bishops were not 
directly involved in Reichskonkordat negotiations until the final 
stage, and then were represented by a single member of their body. It 
has already been mentioned that bishops were traditionally involved at 
the beginning of concordat negotiations. But the overwhelming major-
i ty of the German bishops, including Cardinals Bertram and Faulhaber, 
had very little knowledge of the specifics of the discussions in the 
months of April and May. It was not until May 22, when the die was 
already cast, before the episcopate was officially informed of the de-
tails. This nescience on the part of the bishops is one factor that 
makes it difficult to assess their reaction to the Reichskonkordat--
especially in the early stages. Several reasons can be suggested for 
the Vatican's decision to keep the bishops in the dark, however. First, 
with Pacelli and Kaas in Rome there was probably the feeling that enough 
experience and background knowledge in German affairs was already at 
hand. Kaas' presence was especially valuable considering his prior 
work in the area and Hitler's emphasis on a political issue. Second, 
their track record proved that the German episcopate was too divided 
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to make a quick and meaningful contribution. By seeking their approval 
instead of their advice, the Vatican was able to expedite matters. 
Finally, there is the argument that the German bishops and the Vatican 
were in fundamental disagreement on some important questions and that 
this affected their early relationship during the Reichskonkordat ne-
gotiations. The Vatican knew that the majority of the bishops in April 
and May would never give up the Center Party and, thus, kept them in 
the dark. 34 
One other factor makes it difficult to determine episcopal re-
sponse to the Reichskonkordat~even when the bishops became aware of 
what was going on many were reluctant to talk about it (or write about 
it). Again, some reasonable explanations can be offered. Konrad Repgen 
claims that the protocol at bishop's conferences customarily includes 
only the conclusions of debate, not the various opinions on issues.35 
Bertram's insistence that everything be kept confidential at the spe-
cial Fulda Conference between May 30 and June 2, however, was undoubt-
edly based on the realization that information was valuable. Placed 
in the wrong hands it could be dangerous. Not to be overlooked was the 
fact that it simply was not prudent to correspond openly in Nazi Ger-
many-even at this early stage. Faulhaber warned Pacelli not to answer 
his March 28 letter "because my mail is being inspected. 11 36 Weihbischof 
Johannes Schauer of Munich-Freising was used as a courier between Faul-
haber and the Vatican to pass on confidential material.37 Reporting 
to Pacelli on his trip through Germany in August 1933, Father Leiber 
noted: "It must not be forgotten that most people do not say publicly 
or even in correspondence what they think. All correspondence is 
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subject to surveillance."38 
In spite of these limitations there is still much we can learn 
about the views of the German bishops toward the negotiation and con-
clusion of the Reichskonkordat. We can get a fairly good idea of their 
individual and collective position on the necessity of an agreement 
and the major issues involved. By examining each of the periods of 
negotiation separately, we can also see how their thinking changed 
over time as it responded to changing conditions. Those bishops who 
participated in discussions dealing with the Concordat offer us added 
insight into their motivations. Finally, we can judge to some extent 
how much influence the bishops had with the Vatican and how much they 
were influenced by the Vatican. 
The initial phase of Reichskonkordat negotiations must be seen 
against a background of the Gleichschaltung taking place in Germany 
to understand the preoccupation of the episcopate at the time. On 
March 31, just three days after withdrawing their ban, the government 
issued a "preliminary law for the coordination of the land of the 
Reich." It gave the state governments the power to legislate without 
reference to an emergency decree or to a parliamentary majority. The 
"second law for the coordination of the states with the Reich" was 
issued on April 7 and called for the appointment of Reich Governors 
in all the states. These governors were empowered to appoint and re-
move local governments, dissolve the diets, and appoint and dismiss 
state officials and judges.39 Both actions were in contradiction to 
Hitler's promises on March 23 to maintain the existence of the German 
states and not to use his new powers to change what had been mandated 
in the Constitution. The bishops were naturally worried about the 
maintenance of the Lander concordats. 
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A more immediate threat, however, was the severe pressure placed 
on Catholic organizations to conform and the persecution of Catholic 
political and civil servant officials. Cardinal Bertram aired his 
misgivings to President Hindenburg on April 6, complaining about the 
brutal attacks, house searches, general threats, and dismissal of 
Catholic civil servants "despite years of experience and loyalty. 114° 
On April 8 Cardinal Schulte of Cologne met with Archbishop Klein of 
Paderborn and Bishop Berning of Osnabruck to draw up a pastoral letter 
voicing "the deep anxiety and worry of the bishops that the past days 
of national revival have been days of undeservedly bitter suffering 
for many loyal Catholic citizens and officials. 1141 Acting in unison 
with these western church provinces, Cardinal Bertram and Archbishop 
Grober issued similar pastoral statements on April 12 and 15 on behalf 
of the eastern and Upper Rhenish church provinces.42 Bertram also sent 
letters to Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick on April 12,43 Labor Minis-
ter Franz Seldte on April 15,44 and Hitler himself on April 16 protest-
ing these conditions.45 
Faulhaber informed the Bavarian episcopate of the need for a 
pastoral statement on April 12. In his circular he wrote that the 
bishops "cannot remain silent concerning the flood of violence and hate 
that is now sweeping over the country," adding that he received com-
plaints daily "about why the Church could remain silent through every-
thing .1146 The Bavarian bishops met in Regensburg on April 20 and, like 
Bertram, decided to send letters of protest to key government officials. 
75 
Hitler, Seldte, Culture and Education Minister Hans Schemm, and State 
Interior Minister Adolf Wagner were all targeted for letters. There 
is no mention of the Reichskonkordat as a possible brake on the Nazi 
government (Hitler had received the initial draft in Berlin by this 
time). Rather, the Bavarian bishops directed their concerns and hopes 
to the maintenance of the Bavarian Concordat.47 
Though not officially informed of the details of the Reichskon-
kordat, the bishops were certainly aware that an agreement was being 
negotiated and they had a good idea what the major issue was. On March 
30 the Tagliche Rundshau praised the bishop's declaration withdrawing 
their ban but insisted that only a Reichskonkordat, which the paper 
pointed out was already under way, could bring about a final reconcil-
iation. 48 The Parisan Journal offered a rather complete picture of what 
was transpiring between Berlin and the Vatican on April 6. The Berlin 
correspondent of the paper reported that 
Chancellor Hitler has made overtures to the Vatican relative 
to the conclusion of a concordat. One of the main points is 
to forbid the German ~~tholic clergy ••• to be elected as polit-
ical representatives. 
News of a similar nature was spreading through Munich at about the same 
time. On April 10 Anton Scharnagl, a canon lawyer in the city, wrote 
Pacelli that Faulhaber rejected an elimination of the clergy from polit-
ical parties because "it would appear as a retreat before the demands 
of National Socialism" and would "produce confusion in the ranks."50 
Munich Professor Franz Eggersdorfer wrote Vicar General Riemer of 
Passau on April 12: "Concordat--Pope like Pacelli for Reichskonkordat ••• 
The future of the German Catholics appears to be decided entirely in 
Rome. The consequence of progressive centralism. 115
1 
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One member of the episcopate who received early news from the 
Vatican was Archbishop Grgber. He had worked with Kaas on the Baden 
concordat the previous year and had close ties to Father Leiber. In 
a letter to Leiber on April 15 Gr~ber expressed his hope "that the 
Reichskonkordat will not spoil for us the benefits of the Baden con-
cordat.1152 Five days later, on April 20, Leiber gave Gr~ber a detailed 
briefing of the Kaas draft sent to Berlin on the same day. He wrote 
that Article 43 Section 2 of the Italian Concordat "does not enter into 
the picture. A settlement will be made which will be very suitable for 
the ordinariat. 11 53 Leiber's letter was not sent without the previous 
knowledge of Pacelli.54 
The idea of a special bishop's conference to meet after Easter, 
discuss the situation of Catholics in Germany, and issue a common 
statement was first suggested by Bertram on April 3.55 In preparation 
for this conference representatives of the German church provinces met 
in Berlin on April 25 and 26. Chaired by Bishop Berning of Osnabr~ck, 
this Metropolitan Conference was to assess the growing threat to the 
Church, meet with government officials for explanations, and propose 
suggestions for the special Fulda Conference. Their poor state of 
knowledge concerning the Reichskonkordat negotiations is strikingly 
revealed in the minutes of this two-day conference. Except for Prelate 
Fehr, who was representing the archdiocese of Freiburg at the conference 
and was privy to information from Gr8ber, most of the representatives 
were discussing second and third-hand news. F8hr related that a Reichs-
konkordat was being discussed which would contain almost all of the pro-
" visions of the Lander concordats. He reported that Article 43 of 
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the Italian Concordat would not be included, that confessional schools 
would be protected, and that Catholic associations would maintain the 
same status as outlined in the Church Handbook of 1930.56 
Discussions at the Metropolitan Conference also touched on the 
credibility of Kaas and Papen and the Vatican's perception of the epis-
copate. Bishop Berning recounted a conversation he had with Maria 
Hessberger, Chairman of the German Catholic Woman's League in Berlin. 
While in Rome she reportedly overheard Kaas say that "very dark times 
lay ahead. All Catholic organizations will be destroyed."57 Vicar 
General Johannes Steinmann of Berlin suggested that as long as Kaas 
was dispatched as a middleman to the negotiations "all Catholic organ-
izations will be dissolved. 1158 Prelate Fohr, however, saw Kaas as a 
valuable person in Rome since "directives to the Center and the press 
could be issued through him."59 Concerning von Papen, Berning reported 
that the Vice Chancellor had reassured him on questions of freedom and 
independence of the Church in their April 25 meeting. Papen insisted 
that the bishops should have no fears for the maintenance of Catholic 
organizations and that "a restriction of political activity for the 
clergy was not intended." According to the conference minutes, "the 
explanation of the Vice Chancellor was not believed to be reliable by 
any means. 116° Finally, in comments dealing with the Vatican, Prelate 
Fohr remarked that information coming out of the Catholic news-service 
reported that people in Rome expressed favor over the situation in Ger-
many. 61 Bishop Schreiber of Berlin added that "in the circles of the 
Cardinal Secretary of State not all measures of the German episcopate 
62 
are approved of." 
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The bishops also shared a variety of opinions on Hitler and the 
goals of National Socialism at the Metropolitan Conference. Prelate 
Steinmann related Ambassador Bergen's view that "Hitler has good inten-
tions. The only question is whether he is able to see them through." 
Canon Negwer, representing the archdiocese of Breslau, responded that 
"these friendly remarks must be taken with great suspicion and mis-
trust." Vicar General David from Cologne warned that this was the same 
tactic employed by Mussolini: "Be reassuring on the outside in order to 
work systematically within. 1163 Bishop Schreiber and Vicar General 
David both suggested that the National Socialists were working toward 
the establishment of a Reichskirche. "What Bismarck could not bring to 
a finish in the Kulturkampf they hope to bring to a finish. 1164 Prelate 
Gierse, sitting in for Archbishop Klein of Paderborn, recommended that 
the coming Fulda Conference give the government an ultimatum if clear 
explanations were not forthcoming. 65 
According to the agenda of the conference Bishop Berning and 
Vicar General Steinmann were to meet with and discuss Church problems 
with Hitler. They were received on April 26 and raised four concerns 
of the Catholic Church: freedom of the Church, freedom of the Catholic 
schools, the independence of Catholic associations, and the dismissal 
of Catholic officials because of their beliefs or past association with 
the Center Party. 66 Hitler's answers, reported back to the rest of the 
conference members, could not help but encourage the more optimistic. 
In regard to the schools, a special concern of the hierarchy, he said: 
Secular schools can never be tolerated because such a school 
has no religious instruction and a general moral instruction 
without a religious foundation is built on air; consequently, 
all character training and religion must be derived from faith. 
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Hitler also gave assurances on the other questions, emphasizing that 
he was himself a Catholic and that he attached the greatest importance 
to cooperation with the Church: 
I am absolutely convinced of the great power and the deep 
significance of the Christian religion, and consequently 
will not permit any other founders of religion. Therefore 
I have turned against Ludendorff and separated myself from 
him; therefore I reject Rosenberg's book. That book is 
written by a Protestant. It is not a party book. It is 
not written by him as a member of the party. The Protes-
tants can settle matters with him. 
My desire is that no confessional conflict a.rise. I must 
act correctly to both confessions. I will not tolerate a 
Kulturkarnpf ••• I stand by my word. I will protect the rights 
and freedom of the church and will not permit them to be 
touched. You need havg7no apprehensions concerning the freedom of the church. 
While the German bishops were uninformed of the details of the 
concordat negotiations during this first period, they kept the Vatican 
well-informed of the situation in Germany. Bertram appraised Pacelli 
of the contents of the three pastoral letters issued by the church 
provinces and of his own letters to Hindenburg, Hitler, Frick, and 
Seldte. He urged Pacelli "to take careful notice of these events and 
the concerns voiced by the bishops" in future discussions at the Vati-
can. 68 Two weeks later, on May 1, Pacelli answered Bertram's letter. 
He stated that the Holy Father approved of the efforts made by the 
episcopate and was convinced that they "will remain unperturbed and 
resolute until the goals of the Church are met and a new relationship 
with the state is reached. 1169 
While little headway was made in concordat negotiations during 
the long middle period of correspondence (April 20 to June 28), the 
German bishops finally became officially aware of and involved in the 
process. They were given an opportunity to read and discuss Kaas' 
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draft (actually the second) at the Fulda Conference meeting between 
May ~O and June 2. Their suggestions for revision and general criti-
cisms were forwarded to the Vatican by Bertram later in June. The 
groundwork for the Fulda discussions of the Reichskonkordat, however, 
was laid at the Vatican earlier in May and involved two members of the 
German episcopate--Archbishop Grober and Bishop Berning. It has been 
suggested that Vatican officials used these two churchmen, both of whom 
were sympathetic to its wishes and on favorable terms with the German 
government, to break the news of the concordat and shape the views of 
the rest of the bishops.70 Whether true or not, both would play key 
roles at the Fulda Conference and in the future course of the Reichs-
konkordat. 
The German bishops were all required to visit the Vatican every 
five years and share a personal audience with the Pope. Faulhaber 
II 
made his visit in mid-March 1933. Bishop Berning and Archbishop Grober 
were scheduled one month later. During Berning's visit between May 17 
and 25, the Vatican informed him of concordat proceedings and its future 
intentions concerning the episcopate. In a meeting with Pacelli on May 
18 Berning was assured that the Reichskonkordat would not be concluded 
without the consent of the bishops, that they would be able to express 
their opinions at the forthcoming Fulda Conference, and that a member 
of the episcopate would be present during the final negotiations.71 
Berning's meeting with the Pope on May 20 confirmed Pacelli's promises. 
Pius added that the bishops should take no position at the present time 
on which political party the Catholics should support. "Above all," 
continued the Pontiff, 11 one must not be too optimistic. But also try 
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not to be too pessimistic. We must bide our time as the movement de-
velops .1172 In his final meeting with Pacelli on May 24 Berning made 
note that the Cardinal Secretary of State spoke of less favorable news 
on the Reichskonkordat but encouraged him to keep in touch.73 
Most of the story of episcopal involvement in the Reichskonkordat 
centers on the role of Archbishop Grober. Grober had distinguished 
himself with his earlier work on the Baden Concordat and, as mentioned 
earlier, cultivated friendships with Kaas and Father Leiber in the 
Vatican from that experience. His diplomatic skills are best described 
by his ability to get along as easily with Nazi officials as those of 
the Vatican. At any rate, Grober was not only the first member of the 
episcopate to learn of the contents of the negotiations, but he also 
became the first to examine a draft of the treaty firsthand. This 
took place while he was on his ad-Limina visit to Rome between May 11 
and 23. From this moment until the ratification of the concordat {and 
beyond) he clearly assumed a position of power. Gr~ber was able to 
present himself at the Fulda Conference one week later as "a courier 
from Rome" whose every comment expressed "the official line."74 Armed 
with information unavailable to his colleagues, he was able to speak 
with confidence and dictate the flow of discussion. Grober's knowledge 
was a major reason that conference members chose him to author the final 
pastoral statement. (This was published on June 10 and represented the 
first public declaration of the entire episcopate since the March 28 
declaration.) No less important was the fact that the Archbishop of 
Freiburg was later selected to represent the rest of the bishops in the 
final stages of negotiations at the Vatican.75 
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While precious little is known about Grober's stay in Rome, his 
letter to Kaas on May 25, the day after his return home, reveals his 
state of knowledge of the Reichskonkordat proceedings. Grober wrote 
that he had an opportunity to thoroughly examine the new draft (the 
same sent to Berlin on May 20) and that "the contents as well as the 
wording is very good." He made specific conunents on several Articles, 
most of which were compared to the Baden Concordat. His closing re-
marks were that "fears are ever greater that the radical elements are 
winning power," and that "more and more I realize that the Reichskon-
kordat must be settled as quickly as possible." Only then "will a 
clear situation finally be created. 1176 
The general conference of the total episcopate which met in Fulda 
between May 30 and June 2 was a rarity in German church history.77 As 
we have already learned, planning for the conference began in early 
April and was further developed in the Metropolitan Conference later 
that month. Letters from the heads of Catholic organizations were sent 
to the episcopate throughout the month of May offering proposals for 
consideration at the conference. The bishops had been preparing for 
more than a month to discuss these threats to the Church and to issue 
a major public statement on their position. Discussion of a Reichskon-
kordat draft was a last minute addition to the agenda that nevertheless 
had a critical impact on the content and tone of the Fulda declaration.79 
Most of our information about what was decided at the conference 
comes from Bertram's report to Pacelli and other correspondence after 
the conference broke up. Once again, very little was mentioned about 
the course of debate on the Reichskonkordat (or other matters) in the 
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protocol. The report of Bishop Ludwig Sebastian of Speyer is the only 
one that provides proof that discussions took place. According to his 
minutes of the first meeting on May 30, the bishops learned through 
Schreiber's meeting with von Papen that Hitler considered it a conditio 
~ qua !!E!!. that the clergy be completely eliminated from politics. 
Von Papen reportedly added, however, that the bishops would have the 
right to select a high cleric to represent them. Cardinal Schulte 
strongly protested the conclusion of any treaty with the Nazis, arguing 
that their's was a revolutionary government which lacked respect for law 
and justice. No concordat could be concluded with such a government. 
Grober is reported to have said that negotiations are "progressing 
well" and Berning that everyone should "pray for speed. 1180 
Bishop Preysing of Eichstatt, representing some members of the 
Bavarian episcopate, submitted a written petition to the conference on 
May 31. Its principal focus was on what position the episcopate should 
take toward the Nazi State in their declaration, and what the consequen-
ces of a pacifying statement would be. Preysing cautioned against the 
use of the phrase "new order" or "new state" in the proclamation on the 
grounds that "the State is the same thing as its creator, the National 
Socialist Party." Since the principles of the Nazi Party were still 
incompatible with those of the Church, he argued that the declaration 
should emphasize the dogmatic and ethical themes which were the grounds 
for judging National Socialism in the past.81 Preysing's entreaties 
were ignored at the conference. The compromising tone of the final 
declaration was, in part, a vindication of the Vatican's Reichskonkor-
~policy. 
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A better picture of episcopal reaction to the Reichskonkordat 
draft begins to take shape immediately after the Fulda Conference. 
Grober wrote Kaas on June 3 that the bishops "were not merely in agree-
men t with most paragraphs, they were gratefully welcome." He claimed 
that a number of suggestions were made at Fulda which he had to sup-
press "because they demanded the impossible. 1182 Grober failed to 
mention that the majority of the bishops were firmly opposed to the 
most important article in the draft at this point--Article 31. 
Bertram's report from the Fulda Conference arrived in Rome on 
June 22, nearly three weeks after the meeting had ended. He was heav-
ily overworked during this period because of the illness of his close 
friend, Weihbischof Valentin Wojciech of Breslau. Kaas had written 
Bertram twice--on June 14 and 18--requesting the results, even though 
he had been personally appraised by Berning.83 Bertram's report includ-
ed suggested revisions of Articles 2, 9, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 29, 
31, and 32. Most of the recommendations involved minor changes inter-
minology to correspond with that in the various L&lder concordats. A 
special annotation was made concerning Article 31, however. It read: 
If the §~proval of canon 139 Section 4 ••• shall read only 
"rare," then it will meet the demands of National Social-
ism to thrust aside the clergy from each and every sphere 
of public life. For Germany, where the Church is for the 
most part Volkskirche--that is, not confined to the sacri-
sty--this would be very disadvantageous •••• In many thousands 
of parishes the priest is the only person that can influence 
the course of public life in the Catholic way. There is an 
anti-Catholic tendency which strives for a far-reaching re-
pression of the clergy. The situation in Italy cannot be 
compared to that in Germany. ~Srefore, the repression of 
the clergy is doubly dangerous. 
Kaas responded to Bertram's report on June 27 with a genuine concern 
S5 
for every comment and suggestion. Regarding Article 31, however, Kaas 
wrote, "Opinion can be reserved here until a closer establishment of 
the minimum demands of the government. 11 S6 
Faulhaber's reaction to the concordat draft surfaces in a meeting 
he had with von Papen on June 10. He told the Vice Chancellor that 
"The draft is good, so good that I can scarcely believe that it will 
be approved." Regarding Article 43, which Faulhaber termed "the real 
salient point," he added, "The episcopate in Fulda was not for Article 
43, but I personally declare that the concordat as a whole is so im-
portant, especially concerning the confessional schools, that I believe 
that it should not fail on that account."S7 This was an appraisal that 
the majority of the bishops {and the Vatican) would come to accept 
within a month. Meanwhile, Faulhaber's honesty did little to bolster 
the negotiating position of the Vatican.SS 
The news that the majority of the bishops at Fulda were opposed 
to Article 31 did not surprise von Papen. He had written Bergen in late 
May, "I cannot imagine that the intended opinion of the German episco-
pate corresponds to our own represented standpoint." Von Papen feared 
consultation between the Vatican and the bishops because "the episco-
pate still falls too much under the influence of the Center Party."S9 
The reaction of the bishops to the concordat draft also worried Bergen. 
He was particularly concerned over the possibility that episcopal re-
sistance to specific points in the draft could delay or entirely arrest 
the negotiations, and suspected that Pacelli was playing the wishes of 
the bishops against some of the more uncomfortable government demands.90 
The question of which bishop should represent the episcopate in 
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the final negotiations at the Vatican was decided in late June. In 
his June 10 meeting with von Papen Faulhaber disclosed that his per-
sonal choice was Bishop Preysing, but allowed that "the Archbishop of 
Freiburg has many connections with Pacelli. 1191 Bertram, who took him-
self out of the running, nominated Bishop Joseph Vogt of Aachen. As 
Kaas' letter to Bertram on June 14 implied, the final decision did in-
deed rest with Pacelli: 
Relative to the possible appointment of the Bishop of Aachen 
as representative of your eminence in case you a.re hindered, 
the Cardinal Secretary of State reserve§2his final decision until further news arrives from Berlin. 
Archbishop Grober's selection was made official on June 28.93 
The episcopate's views on von Papen and Kaas remained divided 
during this middle period of negotiations. While Faulhaber obviously 
trusted von Papen enough to share his personal thoughts, Bertram took 
a more reserved position. He wrote Pacelli on June 22 that while von 
Papen undoubtedly had the best of intentions, "his view of the future 
position of the Church in Germany is too optimistic" and "must be judged 
with caution ... 94 In the same letter Bertram claimed that his personal 
representation in Rome was made less demanding because "the presence 
in Rome of the most worthy Prelate Kaas as spokesman of the episcopate 
can always be considered."95 However, at the Fulda Conference Bishop 
Schreiber referred to Kaas as "a thorn in the side. 1196 Faulhaber wel-
corned the news that a bishop would take pa.rt in the final negotiations 
with the comment, "A representative of the episcopate would have the 
advantage that Kaas would then be eliminated. 1197 
The Gleichschaltung was also progressing steadily throughout 
Germany during this middle period. For the most pa.rt the Catholic 
Church and its organizations escaped the blatant acts of terror and 
persecution suffered by the Jewish population and the Communist and 
Social Democratic parties.98 The notable exception was in Bavaria, 
where there was talk of a second revolution.99 The first German 
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Gesellentag (a meeting of all Catholic Journeymen) was held in Munich 
between June 8 and 11. Catholic and Bavarian government officials both 
viewed this gathering as a symbol of Catholic unity and independence. 
SA and SS groups interfered throughout the three-day affair, forcibly 
breaking up the final parade and preventing Faulhaber from delivering 
a pontifical High Mass--all while the police looked on. 100 On the 
following day Faulhaber delivered sharp letters of protest to Hitler, 
Minister President Ludwig Siebert, Interior Minister Adolf Wagner, and 
Heinrich Himmler, head of the Bavarian police.101 But the incident 
gave the Bavarian authorities an excuse to issue an order forbidding 
all public and private gatherings, including outdoor processions. One 
had merely to obtain the permission of the police.102 In a meeting 
with Wagner on June 13 Faulhaber agreed "that in view of the present 
rage of the SA against Catholic organizations, all manifestations in 
groups and in uniform would have to be suspended for two to three 
103 months." 
The gravity of the situation in Bavaria was described by Faul-
haber in a letter to Pacelli on July 3: 
In the course of the last 14 days more than 70 clergy mem-
bers were imprisoned in Bava.ria--the most (14) in the diocese 
of Wurzburg; almost 20 in the diocese of Speyer, where two 
were half beaten to death; 16
4
in the diocese of Eichstaat; 
6 in the diocese of Munich. 
Rumors of his own arrest were reported in several German as well as 
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international newspapers throughout the latter half of June.105 In 
addition to the persecution of Church members, more than 2,000 members 
of the Bavarian People's Party, ranging from municipal. council workers 
to representatives of the Reichstag, were placed in "protective cus-
tody."106 One can understand Faulhaber's willingness to conclude a 
Reichskonkordat which offered legal protection for the Church and its 
organizations at the expense of the political life of the clergy, 
which, for all intents and purposes, was nonexistent anyway. 
Two conditions within Germany had a major impact on the final 
phase of Reichskonkordat negotiations (June 28 to July 8). By the end 
of June the Gleichschaltung of political parties was nearly complete. 
The Social Democrats were forced to break up on June 22, the German 
Nationals dissolved themselves on June 27, and the State Party (former-
ly the German Democrats) followed suit on June 28. Broning, Chairman of 
the Center Party since May 6, told British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir 
Horace Rumbold, on the evening of June 29 that the end of the Center 
was expected on the following day. 107 This turn of events removed 
Hitler's primary motive for desiring a concordat and placed the Vatican 
in an extremely difficult bargaining position. 
At the same time, a new wave of terror and persecution was 
spreading all over Germany, threatening to eliminate Catholic organ-
izations before they could be protected by a Reichskonkordat. 108 Ac-
cording to a Prussian Press Service report on July 1: 
The Secret State Police has today closed the of fices of the 
following associations throughout Prussia and secured their 
publications and property: Friedensbund deutscher Katholiken, 
Windthorstbund, Kreuzschar, Sturmschar, Volksverein fur das 
katholische Deutschla.nd ~ Volksvereinsverlag••••DeU"t;che"" 
Jugendkraft, katholischer Jungmannerverband, as well as all 
societies that are associated with these organizations. 
These measures were necessary because it has turned out that 
they have operated in conjunction with the Center as ene-
mies of the State, seeking to sabotage the annexation of 
a large part of the German people in the national State 
through a systematic agitation. The relationship between 
the national State and the Catholic Church has become en-
dangered through these abuses of religious and Church in-
stitutions for party political purposes. These measures 
will not affect the purely Church organizations which do 
not interfere in parf~9politics and merely serve social and charitable purposes. 
The police action took place simultaneously in the states of Baden 
and Wurttemberg and identified the same Catholic organizations.110 
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This situation had a strong influence on Archbishop Grober, who 
was in Rome on July 1 attending the negotiations on behalf of the 
episcopate. Within an hour of receiving the telephoned news of the 
police action, he informed Pacelli. Grober posed the question of 
whether signing a concordat in these circumstances would be wise, 
saying that "many people would argue that such a treaty at this time 
would tarnish the dignity of the Holy See and would not be understood 
worldwide." However, he countered these arguments with another line 
of reasoning: 
People in Germany both in the episcopate and in the clergy 
as well as leaders of the Catholic laity are united in the 
belief that the concordat must be concluded--and the sooner 
the better. The concordat itself is good and would at least 
establish order for the time being. If this does not come 
to pass then everything will be destroyed in a short time 
and I question whether it can ever be rebuilt. Catholics 
would say: 'The Vatican could have helped us but didn't.' 
The government would publish the Reichskonkordat draft 
and the blame for not signing such a good work would fall 
on the Vatican. 
Grober also furnished Pacelli with Faulhaber's erstwhile reasoning, 
"Even a sharp restriction of the political activity of the clergy can 
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easily be put up with if it succeeds in saving our organizations. 11111 
But members of the episcopate were not "united" in the belief 
that the treaty should be concluded. Faulhaber wired Pacelli on July 
3: 
The Catholic people would not understand if the Holy See 
concluded a treaty with a government while at the same time 
a very large number of Catholic officials sit in jail or 
are removed from their positions without legal proceedings. 
He added the consideration that the government might be interested 
only in eliminating the clergy from politics and honor only that one 
provision of the Concordat. "It must positively be established in the 
protocol," he warned, "what is meant by political activity. 11112 Prey-
sing telegraphed Pacelli on the same day, expanding on his earlier 
warning that a concordat was not possible in such a lawless State, 
especially "at the present time and under the prevailing conditions. 1111 3 
Concordat negotiations commenced at the Vatican on June 30 and, 
pressured by the news coming out of Germany, ended with what appeared 
to be a final agreement on July 2. Pacelli, von Papen, Kaas, and Ber-
gen met on the first day and reached agreement on the first 29 Articles 
114 " . of the text. Grober was summoned by telephone from the Vatican and 
attended the remaining three sessions. Articles 31 and 32 were re-
versed in these final sessions, the first now defining the nature of 
the various Catholic organizations and the second eliminating the clergy 
from membership and activity in political parties. This was done, as 
Bergen informed Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath on June 3, 
in order to place at the end the discussion of removing the 
clergy from politics, a very difficult question for the Vat-
ican, and to confront the Curia with the difficult decision 
whether it could take the responsibility for sacrificing all 
the concessions attained with difficult~ 1 ~ the earlier ar-ticles solely on account of Article 32. 
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Not wanting to take that responsibility, Pius XI approved the text on 
July 2. 116 Bergen offered an appraisal of the negotiations in the 
same communication to Neurath: 
Herr von Papen conducted the negotiations with skill and 
verve; to finish official negotiations for a Concordat in 
four sessions is a record and something new; without the 
excellent preliminary work of Prelate Kaas this would not 
have been accomplished •••• Archbishop Grober of Freiburg 
was ••• present at those sessions on Saturday and Sunday ••• 
The Archbishop displayed a full understanding of the wishes 
of the government and the necessities brought about by the 
new situation •••• The Cardinal Secretary of State was vis-
ibly influenced by reports, letters and telegrams constant-
ly being receiy;~ concerning the arrest and maltreatment 
of the clergy. 
Von Papen dispatched the text of the Concordat by courier to 
Munich, where Hitler was expected to give his assent. Rather than give 
his immediate approval, however, Hitler summoned Neurath, Wilhelm Frick 
(Minister of Interior), Franz von Gurtner (Minister of Justice), and 
Count van Schwerin-Krosigk (Minister of Finance) for consultations in 
Berlin on July 4 and 5. A long list of desired changes resulted and 
were delivered to Rome on July 6 in Hitler's personal airplane by 
Rudolf Buttmann, head of the department of Kulturpolitik in the Minis-
try of the Interior. Buttmann was brought into the Concordat affair 
only two days previously but would supplant von Papen in the negotia-
tions from this point on. 118 Whatever the motivations for Hitler's 
delaying tactics, 119 the Vatican was fully aware of the portending 
120 danger for the Church. 
Both the Vatican and the German government conceded on some major 
points before the Reichskonkordat was finally initialed on July 8. As 
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early as July 3 Grober had requested that the Vatican present the Ger-
man government with a series of demands and make their acceptance a 
condition of Vatican approval of the Concordat. He highlighted these 
three in a draft for Pacelli: The complete termination of repressive 
measures against Catholic organizations, a promise that their sphere 
of activity in relation to National Socialist formations will be delin-
eated and recognized within a month, and the freedom of publication for 
the Catholic press.121 Pacelli included these demands in a letter to 
the German government, adding that they be recognized in a public state-
ment by Hitler at the time of the initialing of the Concordat.122 Hit-
ler released the following statement to the press on July 8: 
The conclusion of the Concordat between the Holy See and the 
government of the Reich appears to me to furnish sufficient 
guarantee that the German citizens of the Roman Catholic faith 
will from now on place themselves unreservedly in the service 
of the new National Socialist state. I therefore issue this 
order: 
1. The dissolution of those Catholic organizations which are 
recognized by the present treaty and which were dissolved 
without instructions by the government of the Reich is to be 
rescinded immediately. 
2. All coercive measures against priests and other leaders 
of the catholic organizations are to be annulled. A repeti-
tion of such measures in the future is inadmissible and will 
be punished in conformity to the existing laws. 
I am happy in the conviction that a period has now been con-
cluded in which religious and political interests unfortu-
nately all too often were locked in seemingly unsolvable 
contradictions. The treaty concluded between the Reich and 
the Catholic Church will serve 123 bring about also in this area the peace which all need. 
Church leaders were quick to note that the statement left out assuran-
ces for protection of the Catholic press and failed to mention that the 
question of protected Catholic organizations would be settled within a 
month's time. 124 
The Vatican had to submit to several changes in the Concordat 
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draft that Buttmann brought from Berlin. Chief among these was the 
question of which of the Catholic social and professional organizations 
would be protected by Article 31. Section 1 of the Article provided 
for the protection without qualification of "those Catholic organiza-
tions and associations which serve exclusively religious, cultural, 
and charitable purposes." Section 2 was directed at those organiza-
tions having social or professional purposes and granted them protec-
tion "insofar as they guarantee to develop their activities outside 
political parties." Since no headway could be made on which Catholic 
organizations comprised Section 2, the Vatican conceded to allow the 
Reich government and the German episcopate "to determine, by mutual 
agreement, the organizations and associations which fall within the 
provisions of this article. 11125 
Grober left Rome for Germany on July 7, one day before the ini-
tialing of the Reichskonkordat. He received news of the provisional 
signing through von Papen, who wired the Archbishop on July 8, "Along 
with you I am convinced that this work will be a foundation stone in 
the friendly inner development of Germany and a blessing for the Church 
and people. 11126 Grober offered his personal reaction to the news in 
letters to Bertram and Faulhaber on July 11. He wrote: 
I have the impression that the Concordat as a whole is a 
good thing which contributes to the calming of the Catholic 
population and to a just treatment of the clergy. I would 
seriously doubt whether a con9~7dat so favorable could have 
been concluded ten years ago. 
Grober's optimism was partially tempered in a July 15 letter to Pacelli: 
There are, to be sure, some bitter pills to swallow, but 
they do not warrant strong consideration when compared to 
the principal articles thaf 2§Uarantee the freedom of the 
Church and its activities. 
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Reactions to the initialing by other members of the episcopate 
were mixed. Bertram withheld judgment, wiring Grober on July 12, "The 
value of all the details that you speak of in such a favorable light 
will be weighed when the full text is supplied. 11129 Faulhaber was 
more optimistic in his response to Grober on the following day: 
Even before its publication the treaty has brought us an 
early present to the extent that the protective custody 
of the clergy has been lifted and that the confiscation 
of buildings and property of 1 ~5sociations recognized in the treaty will be returned. 
Preysing warned Faulhaber that the Nazi suspension of terror should 
not be taken as a concession to the Church for continued negotiations 
(as many believed), but as the Church's reward for initialing the trea-
ty.131 Bishop Vogt of Aachen sent a telegram of thanks and congratu-
lations to Hitler in which he promised that "diocese and Bishop will 
gladly participate in the building of the new Reich. 111 32 In a meeting 
with Austrian Ambassador to the Vatican, Rudolf Kohlruss, on July 16, 
Father Leiber shared some general opinions from German Catholic circles 
that had reached Rome concerning the initialing of the Reichskonkordat: 
Bruning has warned from the very beginning and again and 
again in the last days against the conclusion of the Con-
cordat. At the very least he recommended postponement. 
The bishop from Freiburg has spoken out for the conclusion 
of the Concordat and expects that, with it, the moderate 
circles ••• inside National Socialism can win the upper 
hand and the country can be spared from the experiments 
of the radical wing. 
Other bishops have taken on the opposite view that the 
Catholic circles will be made subservient to National So-
cialism through the Concordat without winning any real in-
fluence. The Church would be charged with an increasing 
responsibility for the further calamitious rule of National 
Socialism, whose power would be extended. Many bishops 
that supported the Concordat earlier have withdrawn from 
that position since the initialing. If this rejection would 
have been articulated so clearly earlier, it Q;he c~33ordat] 
would not have come to the initialing stage at all. 
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Leiber did not identify the bishops he referred to, but his comments 
reveal that there were second thoughts among some members of the epis-
copate--even at this stage. Above all, his communication shows that 
there was a wide range of opinions on the subject among leaders of 
German Catholicism. 
Solving the problem of which Catholic organizations would be 
protected under Section 2 of Article 31 was a major concern of the 
Vatican between July 8 and the official signing of the Reichskonkordat 
on July 20. Pacelli provided Buttmann with a proposed list of organ-
izations for both sections of Article 31 on July a. 13¢ However, the 
"mutual agreement" between the German bishops and the German government 
was now necessary to solve this critical matter. The fate of the Reichs-
konkordat had shifted into the hands of an episcopate which, until re-
cently and except for a select few individuals, was ill-informed of 
the proceedings. 
A meeting to resolve the differences over Article 31 was set to 
take place between Buttmann and representatives of the episcopate in 
the Interior Ministry in Berlin on July 17. Pacelli moved quickly to 
coordinate the preparation for the episcopal response. He telephoned 
Faulhaber on July 10 and urged him "to compile a list of concerned 
organizations as fast as possible." Pacelli added: 
I would be greatly obliged to your eminence if you would 
meet at the same time with the head of the Fulda Conference 
and the Archbishop of Freiburg so that the Vatican can form 
a judgment on this bef 35e the expected signing of the Con-
cordat in eight days. 
The Cardinal Secretary of State contacted both Bertram and Grober on 
July 13 with the same message, requesting them to meet with Faulhaber 
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and work toward a unanimity of opinion on suggested lists for Article 
31.136 
Pacelli's efforts were upset by Bertram, however. One day ear-
lier, on July 12, the Cardinal from Breslau had asked Grober to meet 
with Buttmann "because you are best instructed in the fundamentals of 
the Concordat give and take." Bishop Berning was his recommendation 
as a second representative since "the rest of the north German bishops 
are not initiated in everything. 111 37 Having already scheduled a visit 
with his sick friend, Weihbishof Wojciech, between July 14 and 20, 
Bertram's own participation was ruled out. 138 Uninformed of these 
developments, Faulhaber wired both Grober and Bertram on July 14 asking 
where the three could meet to discuss Article 31. He also suggested 
that an emergency Fulda conference would not be out of the question. 139 
Grober's immediate reply was that a meeting was already scheduled for 
July 17 in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and that Bertram had 
authorized both Berning and him to attend. On the same day Bertram 
explained to Faulhaber that he was off to Upper Silesia and would ap-
prove of whatever arrangements Faulhaber wished concerning Article 31. 14° 
With the meeting only three days away, Faulhaber agreed to the arrange-
ments already made by Bertram. He informed Grober, however, that in-
structions would be sent to Berlin on July 16 for both bishops to con-
'd 141 si er. 
Both Grober and Berning recognized the dilemma they faced in ne-
gotiating the placement of organizations for Article 31. They had the 
alternative of having as many as possible assigned to Section 1, where 
they would have to serve "exclusively religious, cultural, and charitable 
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purposes." These organizations would most likely be protected, but 
they would atrophy in the long run. Or the two bishops could try to 
negotiate the majority of organziations into Section 2, where they 
could serve social and professional functions, but run the risk of 
being incorporated into state and party organizations. 
The meeting took place in the Interior Ministry as scheduled on 
July 17. While the parties did not reach agreement on a final list, 
a general list of organizations had been worked out which was very 
favorable to the Church. Only two organizations had really been lost--
the Volksverein and the Friedensbund Deutscher Katholiken. The first 
was in serious financial difficulties anyway and the second was already 
dissolved. An amicable agreement was also reached on the interpretation 
of Article 31. It was understood that purely religious organizations 
would be allowed to regulate themselves while those which also served 
other purposes could, but need not, be coordinated with general state 
organizations. In either case all would be allowed to retain their 
Catholic character and their own organizational setup, including the 
right to use their own uniforms, insignia, and banners. 142 
Grober informed Pacelli immediately after the meeting that, "The 
discussions inside the Reich Interior Ministry were completely harmon-
ious" and that he was convinced "that adequate guarantees were offered 
to maintain the property and livelihood of the organizations listed 
under Section 2. 111 43 On the following day, July 18, Grober and Berning 
met with the heads of the larger Catholic organizations in Berlin to 
go over the discussions and alleviate their fears. 144 With assurances 
from all concerned, the Vatican declared its satisfaction with the 
results of the meeting and many bishops put their own fears to rest 
regarding the future of Catholic organizations. 
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The Reichskonkordat was formally signed at the Vatican on July 
20 and the customary gifts were exchanged. Pacelli received a Meissen 
Madonna, Cardinal Giuseppi Pizzardo an oil landscape of the Park at 
Sanssouci by Franck, and Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani a silver platter~ 
all with an inscription by the German government. Vice Chancellor van 
Papen received an order, and a similar one was promised Buttmann, who 
received a picture of the Pope in a silver frame in the meantime. The 
German embassy gave a gift of 25,000 lire to the Vatican for charitable 
purposes. 145 The only thing of importance yet to be exchanged were 
ratifications of the treaty. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DECISION TO RATIFY: 
JULY 20 TO SEPTEMBER 10 
The third and final step in the concluding stage of the concor-
dat was ratification. The trouble spots in most concordats were usu-
ally ironed out by the time of initialing, and almost always by the 
time of signing, which is why it often took years to conclude these 
steps in a treaty with the Vatican. While ratification was never taken 
for granted, it was nevertheless an anticlimatic step.1 This was un-
fortunately the case with the Reichskonkordat, despite the myriad of 
present and potential problems facing the Catholic Church and its or-
ganizations in Germany. 
The text was released on July 22 and appeared to be a major coup 
for the Vatican. Except for Article 32, which at this point was a 
rather gratuitous concession to the German government,2 the Concordat 
gave the Church almost everything it had been seeking in negotiations 
for the past thirteen years. The four "impossible" demands that Pacelli 
had given the Reich government in October 1932 in exchange for an ex-
empt army bishop had all been essentially met in the treaty.3 The 
wording was certainly ambiguous, especially in the important articles, 
but this had always been a typical method of solving difficult issues. 
Based on the language of the text alone, the Vatican and the German 
bishops should have been overjoyed. 
The form and content of the agreement was not unlike other church-
112 
state concordats of the modern era. It consisted of a preamble, thirty-
four articles dealing with specific issues, and a protocol clarifying 
some of the more ambiguous areas. Article 1 guaranteed "freedom of 
profession and public practice of the Catholic religion" and the right 
of the Church "to regulate and manage her own affairs independently 
within the limits of laws applicable to all and to issue, within the 
framework of her own competence, laws and ordinances binding on her 
members."4 The second article assured the continued validity of the 
Lander concordats while the third reaffirmed diplomatic representation 
between the Vatican and the Reich. Article 4 allowed for freedom of 
communication between the Vatican and the German clergy and between 
the bishops and their flock "in all matters of their pastoral office." 
Articles 5 through 10 dealt with the legal status of the clergy 
and granted them the same rights found in the Llhider and other State 
concordats. The next two articles concerned the regulation of dio-
cesean boundaries while Article 13 guaranteed Catholic parishes, epis-
copal sees, religious orders, etc. the same rights as any other public-
ly recognized corporation "in accordance with the general laws applic-
able to all." Number 14 dealt with the appointment of bishops and ob-
ligated the Church, before assigning a bishop, to ask state authorities 
if they had any general political objections. This "political clause" 
appeared in concordats with a number of other countries including Po-
land (1925), Rumania (1927), Portugal (1928), and Italy (1929) as well 
as in the Lfuider concordats.5 In the protocol at the end of the Con-
cordat, the Church was able to secure the concessions that the State's 
objections were to be presented within twenty d~s and that Article 14 
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"does not establish for the State a right of veto." Article 15 pro-
vided religious orders freedom for their pastoral, charitable, and 
educational work while 16 required new bishops, selected with the con-
sent of the government, to swear an oath of loyalty to the state. 
Article 17 guaranteed the property of the Church "according to the 
common law of the state," and 18 finally assured the Vatican that fu-
ture subsidies to the Church would not be withheld without their con-
sultation. 
The greatest concessions to the interests of the Church involved 
the field of education and were covered by Articles 19 through 25. The 
first two affirmed the continuance of Catholic theological faculties 
at state-supported universities and the right of the Church to establish 
theological seminaries. By Article 21, 
Catholic religious instruction in the primary schools, voca-
tional schools, and higher educational institutions is a reg-
ular subject of instruction and it is to be taught in accor-
dance with the principles of the Catholic Church. 
Article 22 gave the Church the right of veto over the appointment and 
continuation of Catholic teachers of religion. Number 23 guaranteed 
"the maintenance of the existing Catholic confessional schools and the 
establishment of new ones" wherever parents requested it and the number 
of prospective pupils was sufficiently large. Finally, Articles 24 
and 25 protected the professional training of teachers for catholic 
confessional schools and the right of religious orders "to establish 
and run private schools." All of these articles were to be carried out 
"within the limits of the general legislation and conditions laid down 
by law." 
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With Article 26 the Vatican realized its old demand for changes 
in the marriage law and the government achieved its wish for an "exempt 
pastoral ministry" for the army in Article 27. However, the army bish-
op was to be selected by mutual agreement of the Reich government and 
the Holy See, and only priests who had the approval of their local 
bishop could be appointed as military chaplains. Article 28 guaranteed 
the Church the right of pastoral care in state-run institutions like 
hospitals and prisons. Number 29 afforded catholic minorities the same 
liberty to use their mother tongue as "individuals of German descent and 
language [}iad] with the territory of the foreign state in question." 
Article 30 required that a prayer be said "for the welfare of the German 
Reich and its people" after every High Mass. 
Articles 31 and 32, as we have seen, dealt with the issue of 
Catholic organizations and were the primary obstacles to the conclusion 
of the Concordat. We have also seen that the impasse over the first 
had been solved by postponing the lists of protected Catholic organi-
zations. Both were marked by ambiguous language which would lead to 
difficulties in the future, but without which the Concordat may never 
have been concluded. Just what "exclusively religious, purely cultural 
and charitable purposes" were was far from clear. Equally unclear was 
the line between religion and politics drawn up in the final protocol 
for Article 32. It held that while the clergy was not allowed to join 
a political party or participate in party activities, this "did not 
involve any sort of limitation of the preaching and interpretation of 
the dogmatic and moral teachings and principles of the Church in ac-
cordance with their duty." Article 33 ended the Concordat on the same 
friendly note found in the Lander concordats: 
Should any difference of opinion occur in the future regard-
ing the interpretation or application of a stipulation of 
this Concordat, the Holy See and the German Reich will effect 
a friendly solution by mutual agreement. 
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In the following years Catholic Church leaders would fruitlessly turn 
to this article in hopes of seeking redress of their grievances. 
The Vatican had also been able to secure, at the behest of the 
episcopate, a secret annex to the Concordat which regulated the induc-
tion of theological and regular and secular clergy into the armed ser-
vices in the event of universal military service. 6 Under this secret 
agreement students of philosophy and theology preparing for the priest-
hood in Catholic institutions were exempt from military service except 
in the event of general mobilization. In the case of a general mobili-
zation 
bishops, members of the diocesean courts, principals of 
seminaries and ecclesiastical hostels, professors in sem-
inaries, the parish priests, curates, rectors, coadjutors, 
and the clergy who permanently preside over a church of 
public worship 
did not have to report for service. 
In spite of terms so favorable to the Church, the reaction of the 
bishops to the signing and release of the Concordat was generally cau-
tious. Both Bertram and Faulhaber sent letters of congratulations to 
Hitler within days of the signing. Bertram's letter of "recognition 
and thanks" was sent on July 22 "in the name of the Fulda Bishop's 
Conference" and assumed a guarded but optimistic tone. Since the Chan-
cellar's July 8 declaration, wrote Bertram, the episcopate of all the 
dioceses in Germany 
have expressed their sincere and joyful preparedness to co-
operate as best they could with the present government which 
had set itself the tasks of promoting the Christian education 
of the people, repelling ungodliness and immorality, develop-
ing readiness to make sacrifices for the common good, and 
protecting the rights of the Church. 
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Bertram added that the harmonious cooperation of Church and State for 
the achievement of these lofty aims had now been confirmed by the sign-
ing of the Reichskonkordat.7 
Faulhaber's letter, written in longhand, was sent two days later. 
A mixture of unqualified praise and undisguised skepticism, his letter 
covered the broad spectrum of episcopal feelings toward the Concordat. 
Faulhaber opened on a laudatory note: 
What the old parliaments and parties could not accomplish in 
60 years, your statesmanlike foresight has achieved in six 
months. For Germany's prestige in East and West and before 
the whole world this handshake with the Papacy, the greatest 
moral power in the history of the world, is a feat of immeas-
urable blessing. 
"It can now be proven to all the world," continued Faulhaber, "that 
Chancellor Adolf Hitler can not only give great speeches, ••• but that he 
can also deliver actions of worldwide significance as with the Reichs-
konkordat. 11 He went on to express his hope "that the articles of this 
Concordat will not remain on paper," but would be put into practice. 
It was further hoped that the "lower ranks of the first, second, and 
third level will not remain all too far behind the statesmanlike great-
ness of the Ftihrer. 11 Faulhaber also thanked Hitler for allowing the 
L&ider concordats to remain in force, even though these "came into being 
without the cooperation of the NSDAP." He closed with a request that 
insured his letter would never be published, asking Hitler to "crown 
the great hour with a magnanimous amnesty for those who have committed 
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no crime but are kept in protective custody for their political con-
victions.118 
Only one other bishop sent his congratulations directly to Hit-
ler. Bishop Bornewasser of Trier, in conjunction with von Papen, used 
the occasion of the ceremonial unveiling of the holy frock of Christ 
in the cathedral of Trier on July 24 to offer his thanks and "to assure 
the FUhrer, who is endeavoring to restore the Christian, national, and 
social foundation of the new state, our steadfast cooperation in the 
work of resurrecting the German Reich."9 Bishop Berning wrote Bertram 
on the same day that various parties had expressed a wish to hold a 
thanksgiving service at the time of the ratification of the Concordat. 
"At the same time," added Berning, "the thanksgiving service can offer 
an official prayer in which God can give benediction to the efforts of 
the government in fulfillment of their responsible duties."10 Bertram 
later explained his grounds for rejection in a letter to Faulhaber: 
I cannot assent to the proposal from Osnabruck of striking 
up a general thanksgiving service concerning the Reichskon-
kordat. Today is not yet the proper time to join in the 
general Kling-Klang-Gloria. That is neith~1 ingratitude nor 
sulkiness on my part, but serious concern. 
Neither the Vatican nor the German government treated the terms 
of the Reichskonkordat as a victory for the Church. In mid-August 
Pacelli told Ivone Kirkpatrick, British Charg~ d'Affaires to the Vat-
ican, how it was that he had come to sign a concordat with "such peo-
ple." Kirkpatrick reported the Cardinal Secretary of State's words 
to his Foreign Office: 
A pistol, he said, had been pointed at his head and he had 
had no alternative. The German Government had offered him 
concessions, concessions, it must be admitted, wider than 
any previous German government would have agreed to, and he 
had to choose between an agreement on their lines and the 
virtual elimination of the Catholic Church in the Reich. 
Not only that, but he was given no more than a week to make 
up his mind. 
It is clear from the same report that Pacelli harbored no illusions 
about the intentions of the German government, but saw value in the 
treaty nonetheless. Kirkpatrick continued to quote Pacelli: 
If the German government violated the Concordat--and they 
were certain to do so--the Vatican would have a treaty on 
which to base a protest. In any case ••• the Germans would 
probably not vf~late all the articles of the Concordat at 
the same time. 
The only response on the part of the German government that 
counted was that of Hitler. It was delivered at a cabinet meeting 
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on July 14, the day the Reichskonkordat was approved by the govern-
ment. Responding to the skepticism of some members of the cabinet, 
Hitler outlined "three great advantages" of the treaty: 
1. That the Vatican had negotiated at all, while they 
operated, especially in Austria, on the assumption that 
National Socialism was un-Christian and inimical to the 
Church; 
2. That the Vatican could be persuaded to bring about a 
good relationship with this purely National German state. 
He, the Reich Chancellor, would not have considered it 
possible even a short time a.go that the Church would be 
willing to obligate the bishops to this state. The fact 
that this had now been done was certainly an unreserved 
recognition of the present regime; 
3. That with the Concordat, the Church withdrew from 
activity in associations and parties, e.g. also abandoned 
the Christian labor unions. This too, the Reich Chancellor 
would not have considered possible even a few months ago. 
Even the dissolution of the Center could be termed final 
only with the conclusion of the Concordat, now that the 
Vatican had ordered t3e permanent exclusion of the priests 
from party politics. 
Hitler was clearly more concerned with the political effect that the 
Concordat would have at home and abroad than he was in carrying out its 
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terms. 
The official signing of the Reichskonkordat did, in fact, produce 
a reaction among German Catholics not unlike that following the March 
28 declaration of the bishops. Since the initialing of the agreement 
on July 8 and Hitler's concomitant address calling off the police ac-
tion, a false period of tranquility once again deluded the Catholic 
populace. This general feeling of optimism was bolstered by the ap-
pointment of Bishop Berning to a position in the reorganized Prussian 
Council of State (Staatsrat) on July 11. Though the council did not 
wield any real power, Berning was nevertheless the first Catholic bish-
op to be offered (and to accept) a state office under the control of 
the Nazis of such considerable prestige. 14 German Catholics could not 
help but perceive that their bishops had finally accepted National So-
cialism. The signing of the Reichskonkordat on July 20 reinforced 
this belief. 
July 20 was a date that many Catholic scholars and theologians 
had been anxiously awaiting. They were quick to justify the reconcili-
ation of Church and State by discovering numerous affinities between 
National Socialism and Catholicism. For example, Professor Joseph 
Lortz, a famous Church historian, wrote that both Nazism and Catholi-
cism were opposed to Bolshevism, liberalism, relativism, atheism, and 
public immorality, and held in common the belief in corporatist prin-
ciples and the importance of faith as something grand and heroic. 
Michael Schmaus, Professor of Dogmatic Theology at M~nster, argued 
that Catholicism shared with National Socialism "the just concern for 
maintaining the purity of the blood, the basis for the spiritual 
structure of the people." Both wrote books which appeared in a new 
series--"Reich ~ Kirche"-which was published with ecclesiastical 
approval. The series announced the following aims: 
Being entirely German and entirely Catholic, the series will 
examine and promote the relations and encounter between Ca-
tholicism and National Socialism, and it will point the way 
toward the kind of fruitful cooperation that is outlined in 
the Reichskonkordat. 
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The world-renowned theologian, Karl Adam of Tubingen, Professor Theodor 
Brauer of Cologne, theologian Karl Eschweiler of Braunsberg and others 
also worked to facilitate an "ideological Gleichschaltung" within the 
Catholic ranks.15 Their efforts to extol the virtues of National 
Socialism made it even more difficult to hold the Nazis accountable to 
the terms of the Concordat. 
The bishops and the Vatican did not have long to wait before the 
first major complication involving the interpretation of the treaty 
took place. Within a week a bitter press war threatened to cancel the 
ratification ceremony--or at least delay it for a number of months. 
The episode began with a speech delivered by Vice Chancellor von Papen 
before the Association of Catholic Academicians in Berlin on July 22. 
While hailing the Concordat as "the final conclusion of the Kulturkampf 
in Germany," von Papen later remarked, "There ••• exists, of course, an 
undeniable inner connection between the dissolution of the German Center 
Party that has just taken place and the conclusion of the Concordat. 1116 
On the same day an article in the Nationalsozialistische Parteikorre-
spondenz stated pointblank that the signing of the Reichskonkordat 
signified "the recognition of the National Socialist state by the Cath-
olic Church. 111 7 A lead article in the Volkischer Beobachter two days 
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later echoed this theme, arguing that it was not simply Reich or state, 
but rather "National Socialism in Germany that has been recognized in 
the most solemn way by the Catholic Church.1118 
These commentaries were answered by two articles in the Osserva-
tore Romano on July 26 and 27. Written by Pacelli but not published 
under his signature, the articles focused on the advantages that the 
treaty brought to the Church. They also stressed that the Vatican had 
traditionally maintained a position of neutrality toward various forms 
of government, and had, in fact, negotiated in the past with a wide 
variety of such governments in order to guarantee the rights and liber-
ties of the Church. Thus, the Reichskonkordat did not represent "a 
confirmation or recognition of a specific trend of political doctrines 
and ideas. 1119 
The press war began to heat up when Interior Minister Buttma.nn 
responded to the Vatican replies in the German papers on July 28. He 
pointed out that the Vatican had concluded the Concordat with the Ger-
man Reich which, "as Rome should know, is completely dominated by the 
National Socialist 'trend.' The conclusion of the treaty therefore 
means the de facto and~ jure recognition of the National Socialist 
20 government." Before matters got too far out of hand the German For-
eign Ministry stepped in to mediate. A mutual agreement was reached 
by Vatican and Interior Ministry officials to sheathe their pens, but 
an ominous cloud was left hanging over the Concordat. 21 
Members of the episcopate expressed concern over the press polem-
ics but drew somewhat different conclusions regarding the motives of 
the German government. In a letter to Grober on August 1 Faulhaber 
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made the observation that Buttmann's reply "certainly reveals how care-
ful the ••• other side will be not to assume an obligation which will 
go beyond the strict wording of the Concordat. 1122 Grober himself had 
a more optimistic explanation which he offered to Leiber on August 7: 
It is my opinion that the newspaper polemics of the past 
week show that the leading members ~f the government] are 
serious about the Concordat and cannot be unnerved. I 
attribute the irritating tone of the German explanation 
to psychological reasons. The German government has re-
ceived no congratulations for the Concordat within certain 
circles because ~3ese are still not yet free of the Kultur-
kampf mentality. 
In trying to distinguish between the intentions of the higher author-
ities (especially Hitler) and those of the lower levels, Gr~ber was 
expressing a view that many Church leaders would cling to throughout 
1933. 
The principal complication between the signing of the Concordat 
and its ratification centered on the clarification of Article 31. 
While the bishops and the Vatican had always considered the catholic 
organizations, particularly the schools and youth associations, the 
lifeblood of the Church, they did not realize that the independence of 
these organizations was a major obstacle to Hitler's goal of a~-
gemeinschaft. Nor did they understand at this point in time that a 
totalitarian government could not brook any form of competition to its 
authority, whether it be in the political, social, or religious sphere. 
It would not become clear to Church leaders until it was too late that 
their inability to come to an understanding with the German government 
on the language and enforcement of Article 31 reflected the impossibil-
ity of compromise on this issue. Meanwhile, Article 31 became for 
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Church leaders a touchstone of the German government's trustworthiness 
and its willingness to execute the provisions of the Reichskonkordat.24 
Section 3 of Article 31 required the German episcopate and the 
Reich government "to determine, by mutual agreement, the organizations 
and associations which fall within the provisions of this article." 
But once a.gain the bishops had no information at their disposal. They 
were especially anxious to receive a copy of the interpretation of 
guidelines worked out by Pacelli and Buttma.nn in Rome on July 20. 
Faulhaber wrote the Bavarian bishops on July 24 that no word on Article 
31 had arrived yet, but he was expecting delivery of the guidelines 
from Berning at any time. 25 Grbber informed the Vatican on July 26 
that "Letters and telephone inquiries flow to me daily concerning 
guarantees for ~atholi~ organizations coming under Section b." He 
requested a draft of the understanding that Pacelli and ButtDE.nn had 
26 tt worked out. In a letter to Faulhaber on the same day, Grober la-
mented that he was still without a draft of the list or guidelines, 
but said that he was expecting it soon. 27 
Eight days after the signing of the Concordat and still without 
instructions from the Vatican, Berning decided to contact Buttma.nn on 
his own. In his letter of July 28 Berning outlined several questions 
concerning Catholic youth organizations which demanded immediate clar-
ification. Chief among them were problems with the leadership of the 
Hitler Youth organization and the fact that "in some states or parts 
of states--especially in Bavaria, Thuringia, and wtirttemberg--restric-
tive measures have to date not yet been lifted." He implored Buttma.nn 
to release "the exact language of the interpretation of guidelines for 
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Article 31."28 
Meanwhile, Kaas and Buttmann met in Rome on July 29 to refine 
the guidelines once again. 29 (On July 20 Pacelli and Buttmann "clari-
fied" the guidelines worked out three days earlier by Grober, Berning, 
and Buttmann in Berlin.) News of their understanding reached the Ger-
man bishops on July 31. That it came via the morning newspapers made 
the information somewhat less than official. 
n 
In a letter to Grober on 
August 1 Faulhaber noted that the guidelines appeared in the newspapers 
"without a signature and, therefore, it appears, without responsibil-
ity."30 Writing Bertram about the newspaper reports on the following 
day, Faulhaber quipped, "The bishops themselves, however, have no in-
formation at this point on what actually has been settled between the 
Reich government and the episcopate. 1131 
On July 31 Buttmann finally submitted a detailed list of organ-
izations for Article 31 to Bertram. The list covered Sections 1 and 2 
and was based on organizations given in the last edition of the Kirch-
liches Handbuch fur ~ Katholische Deutschland. Buttmann asked Ber-
tram to distribute the list to the rest of the bishops for consideration 
and suggestions, and to inform the heads of Catholic organizations not 
to petition the Interior Ministry, but allow the episcopate and the 
government to work out any differences.32 Bertram wrote back on August 
3 requesting lists for all 27 bishops, or at the very least, lists for 
Grober, Berning, Faulhaber, Cardinal Schulte, and Archbishops Hauck of 
Bamberg and Klein of Paderborn.33 It was not until August 12, however, 
that Berning was able to mail a list to every member of the Fulda and 
Bavarian bishops. He included a letter which assured the bishops that 
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''Proposals on additions or deletions as well as special suggestions 
for the allotment of organizations and associations to other groups 
can still be considered." The final decision on the list, according 
to Berning, would be ma.de at a second major Fulda conference of all 
the bishops scheduled for August 29 to 31.34 
The information drought experienced by the bishops came to an 
~ 
end on August 15 when Kaas sent Grober the text of the guidelines that 
he and Buttmann had negotiated on July 29. Kaas reaffirmed in his 
letter, however, that "the final settlement of the catalog of organ-
izations is primarily the concern of the episcopate." He also sounded 
a prescient warning: 
Without clarity over these essential points the ratification, 
which according to my information is expected to take place 
around September 8, would be irresponsible, because after-
wards the considerable differences of opini3g which would 
emerge would be very difficult to overcome. 
While the bishops were busy trying to secure information on Arti-
cle 31, the Gleichschaltung was continuing unabated in all parts of 
Germany. Catholic organizations and youth groups in the south and 
west encountered the greatest pressure.36 By one of those strange 
coincidences (perhaps not so strange in Nazi Germany), on the same day 
that the guidelines for interpreting Article 31 appeared in the German 
newspapers Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Youth, published 
an edict which forbade members of National Socialist youth organizations 
from belonging to confessional youth organizations.37 This affront to 
the Concordat, less than ten days after the treaty was signed, was the 
first public reaction by a leader of a Nazi organization. it is some-
what surprising that the bishops failed to take this action more 
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seriously (they did not mention it in their correspondence until the 
end of August). It is more surprising yet that von Papen was the first 
Catholic leader to respond to this attack. He informed Kaas (on vaca-
tion in South Tyrol) that his protest to the Interior Ministry had 
found satisfaction.38 
One danger that the episcopate was quick to respond to was the 
voluntary dissolution or coordination of Catholic organizations by 
local clergy and leaders of Catholic groups. The demands and threats 
by local government authorities and organs of the SA were stepped up 
in the weeks following the signing of the treaty. Berning warned of 
this growing danger in a letter to Faulhaber on July 28 and reconunended 
that all of the dioceses be informed that 
existing Catholic organizations be maintained in their pre-
sent condition and that no priest or president [9f an organ-
izatio~ be authorized, without expressed approval f3~m a 
bishop, to dissolve or 'coordinate' an organization. 
Bertram made this recommendation official in a circular to the rest of 
the bishops on August 1.4° 
Monsignor Ludwig Walker, President of the Katholische Jungm~er-
verband, had sent a lengthy report to the special Fulda conference in 
late May which signaled the dangers posed by the Nazi Gleichschaltung.41 
One month after the signing of the Concordat, with yet another special 
conference on the horizon, Walker once again cataloged his concerns 
for the episcopate. His report this time was even more comprehensive, 
documenting the systematic persecution of Catholic youth associations 
"in spite of the Concordat." While granting that there had been a 
general easing of tensions since August in the north German dioceses, 
Walker's report showed that the situation in the south--particularly in 
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Bavaria, the Palatinate, Wurttemberg, and in parts of Baden--was "very 
bad." Youth activities in these areas were impeded to the broadest 
extent by "commandeering, prohibitions of assembly, and all sorts of 
other difficulties. 1142 
Grober and Berning met with Walker and other heads of the larger 
Catholic organizations in Freiburg on August 24 to gather further in-
formation for the approaching bishop's conference. The news by this 
• time was predictable, however. Grober wrote Kaas two days later that 
the association heads "unfortunately had nothing essentially new to 
say. It is the same old dispute over the classification in Article 
31.1143 
A second major conference of all the German bishops in three 
months indicated an awareness of the problems facing them and an under-
standing that they must work together to solve them. Planning for the 
conference had actually begun immediately after the signing of the Con-
cordat. Bertram sent a circular to the bishops suggesting that they 
meet to discuss the terms of the Concordat, "Perhaps at the end of 
August or the beginning of September. Preferably at Fulda."44 A con-
ference agenda was circulated on August a45 and the last week in August 
was selected by the majority of the bishops as the most convenient 
time.46 Unlike the Fulda Conference at the end of May, the issue of 
the Reichskonkordat was the predominant topic of discussion from the 
outset. 
The minutes of this three-day conference (it met from August 29 
to 31) showed that a number of topics were addressed in addition to the 
Concordat. Chief among these was a debate on Catholic Action,47 a 
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report on the sterilization law,48 and a survey of the dangers facing 
the Catholic press. Regarding the latter, the observation was ma.de 
that, "If the persecution and suppression of the Catholic press con-
tinues to the same extent as in the past weeks, there will soon be no 
Catholic press. 1149 But the primacy of the Reichskonkordat as the main 
focus of attention also came through in the protocol. While articles 
dealing with education received top billing,50 the minutes show the 
bishops confirmed in their resolution "that Article 31 of the Reichs-
konkordat must be completely upheld so that a dissolution of organiza-
tions ••• does not come into question." A number of "great dangers" 
were cited which threatened that very possibility. They included: 
the suppression and dissolution of organizations by "subordinate of-
ficials"; withdrawal of members; the economic collapse of organizations; 
the lack of "new blood"; and the loss of equality of rights relative to 
the Hitler Youth.51 A number of steps were outlined to deal with these 
dangers, including the need to clarify the interpretation of the words 
"religious, cultural, charitable, and social" and the concepts "pro-
tection of organizations. 11 52 
The critical question facing the German bishops at the Fulda 
Conference did not appear in the protocol, however. As the tentative 
date for ratification drew nearer the Vatican was faced with the dif-
ficult choice of speeding up the proceedings or pressing for the set-
tlement of all outstanding grievences. Pacelli wished for input from 
the German bishops before making the fateful decision, and had Kaas de-
liver his request through Grober. (This was done by letter on August 
15.)53 While the episcopate was by no means united in their final 
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verdict, an apparently clear majority opted for a quick ratification. 
Bertram's report to Pacelli on the conference proceedings documents 
the fact: "A delay of the ratification of the Reichskonkordat is not 
recommended. On the contrary it is hoped that the ratification takes 
place real soon." A number of reasons were cited: 
1. Many voices are being raised against the Concordat. 
Some even are maintaining that the Reich Chancellor is 
seeking only to gain foreign political prestige with the 
Concordat and does not wish to see the full internal de-
velopments which it entails. 
2. Wide circles declare the government has gone too far 
in its concessions; a contrary movement would be desirable. 
Such voices would become louder if ratification were de-
layed. This causes concern among the Catholics. 
3. Only with the ratification will we achieve the possi-
bility of proceeding more definitely against the numerous 
anti-Catholic measures. But if ratification is delayed 
the position of the episcopacy will ~~ made worse, which 
will not benefit the Catholic cause. 
We learn form Grober's letter to Kaas on September 1 that while 
the general mood in Fulda was "not rosy" (conditions in Bavaria, he 
said, were "still quite deplorable"), it was nevertheless decided that 
ratification should take place "as soon as possible." 
,, . 
Grober pointed 
out that Faulhaber was "pessimistic and feared above all that [}he 
treat:U would fall through," but added, "I dispelled the hesitations."55 
In a letter to Father Leiber on the following day Grober again related 
the episcopate's wish for a speedy ratification, but insisted that 
"guarantees were still necessary." These included: equality of rights 
and protection for Catholic organizations and the Catholic press, 
justice for Catholics who suffer because of their political past, an 
end to persecutions by subordinate Nazi organs, and "freedom at last 
for the publication and advocacy of Catholic teachings and principles. 1156 
How a speedy ratification and additional guarantees could be reconciled 
130 
was never explained. 
It seems inconceivable that the Vatican could have ratified the 
Concordat without an agreed list of Catholic youth and other organi-
zations in hand-especially after the troubles encountered after the 
signing of the treaty.57 But that is exactly what happened. GrSber 
and Berning met with Buttmazm on September 6 in Berlin to go over the 
list of organizations approved by the Fulda Conference. Once again, 
no special difficulties were encountered. Once again as well, no 
agreement was reached on a list of organizations. Gr8ber informed 
the episcopate on September 9, however, that Buttmann "promised thor-
ough redress [of complaints] as soon as the Concordat was ratified and 
legal sanctions could be applied. 11 58 Given their decision to push for 
a quick ratification, it was easy for the majority of the bishops (and 
officials at the Vatican) to accept still more government assurances. 
Though Church leaders did not know it at the time, the September 6 
meeting in Berlin was their last "honest" chance to negotiate guaran-
tees for their organizations.59 It is far more likely that they never 
had a cha.nee. 
At the beginning of August, soon after the press war episode, 
Pacelli had informed the German Foreign Office of his wish to exchange 
documents "before the start of his vacation on September 8. 1160 The 
ratification of the Concordat had revolved around that date ever since. 
By the beginning of September nothing short of a renewed police action 
would have delayed it. Pacelli's own reasons for pressing on with the 
exchange were revealed in his earlier conversation with British Charg~, 
Kirkpatrick-he had been offered concessions "wider than any previous 
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German government would have agreed to," he had to "choose between an 
agreement on their lines and the virtual elimination of the Catholic 
Church in the Reich," and the Church "would have a treaty on which to 
base a protest. 1161 In addition to these (and perhaps more important), 
Pacelli now had the blessings of the German bishops. On September 10, 
the dccy- that the ratifications of the Reichskonkordat were exchanged 
in Rome, Pacelli telegraphed Bertram to express his thanks for all the 
bishops had done. He added that if the Holy See gave in to the specif-
ic wish of the government for prompt ratification before all griev-
ances had been settled, "the determining factor had been the highly-
esteemed views of the German Bishop's Conference. 1162 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
It is ironic that historians have credited the German bishops 
with the same decisive influence on the outcome of the Reichskonkordat 
that Pacelli suggested. The impression is left by most of the liter-
ature on the subject that the Vatican and the German episcopate were 
in fundamental agreement on the terms of the Concordat and that a 
spirit of cooperation pervaded the negotiations. The actual situation 
was more complicated than that. Equally unfortunate is the fact that 
the collective statements by the episcopate during this period--par-
ticularly the Fulda declarations of March 28 and June 10--have labelled 
the bishops as willing, if not eager, supporters of a policy of cooper-
ation with National Socialism. While both statements no doubt had that 
effect, and confused many loyal Catholics in the process, I have tried 
to demonstrate that the bishops, especially in the early stages, were 
responding to the wishes of the Vatican, or what they perceived those 
wishes to be. 
If there ever was a time for the Church to "get tough" with Na-
tional Socialism it was in the years before Hitler came to power. In 
the period following the Katastrophenwahlen on September 14, 1930, it 
was the bishops who took a stand against the Nazi Party. While their 
actions could more accurately be described as a series of stands that 
were marked by sometimes conflicting and almost always ambiguous 
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statements, the fact remains that the entire episcopate held stead-
fastly to the ban for more than two years. The ban continued through 
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933 and the Nazi 
"victory" in the elections on March 5. Indeed, the intransigence of 
the bishops seemed to defy the hallowed tradition of Obrigkeit and 
the historical ties between throne and altar in Germany. 
It is clear that the Vatican during this same period was follow-
ing a policy of rapprochement toward Hitler and his party, a strategy 
that was not lost on the bishops. Faulhaber related to the Bavarian 
bishops how Pius XI praised Hitler as a bastion against the Communist 
threat, and how Vatican officials "judged National Socialism like 
Fascism, as the only deliverance from Communism and Bolshevism." A 
statement was made at the Metropolitan Conference in late April that 
"not all measures of the German episcopate a.re approved of" in the 
circles of the Cardinal Secretary of State. After the March 5 elec-
tions diminished the value of the Catholic parties as protectors of 
Church interests, Rome's willingness to negotiate a treaty with the 
German government became understandable. Time may tell what the re-
lationship was between events in March and the beginning of Reichs-
konkordat negotiations. It is ha.rd to believe at this point, however, 
that the Vatican was not at least indirectly involved in l~ing the 
groundwork for an agreement. 
The German bishops had never been adverse to the idea of a 
Reichskonkordat, having supported Vatican attempts to negotiate one 
since 1920. The fact remains, however, that the bishops were more 
involved in negotiations in 1920 than they were in 1933. Six weeks 
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passed from the start of negotiations in Rome before Bertram and Faul-
haber were officially informed. When the episcopate met in Fulda eight 
days later to discuss the draft of the treaty (acutally the second), 
it became clear that they were not willing to accept a major restric-
tion of the political activity of the clergy--a conditio ~ qua~ 
for the German government and a condition that the Vatican was willing 
to compromise on. While the terror campaign and dissolution of the 
Catholic parties made compromise academic in the end, the apparent 
resistance of the bishops on this issue may have been a major reason 
that they were sidelined during the negotiations. At any rate, it 
revealed that the episcopate and the Vatican did not see eye to eye 
on a very important article in the agreement. 
In retrospect it was unwise on the part of Rome to keep the bish-
ops uninformed, especially Cardinals Bertram and Faulhaber. Choosing 
to work through and with Grober had its advantages, the most important 
being that Gr8ber supported the major Vatican positions and was "ac-
ceptable" to the Nazi government. But when it came time for the epis-
copate as a whole to bear the burden of negotiations, as Section 3 of 
Article 31 required, the bishops were ill-prepared to respond. The 
failure to secure an agreed list of protected Catholic organizations 
in meetings with Buttmalln on July 17 and September 6 was due as much 
to a lack of preparation as it was the incompetence and credulity of 
Grober and Berning. 
Just as the Gleichschaltung and persecution of Catholic organi-
zations was never uniform throughout Germany, the response of the bishops 
to National Socialism and the Concordat was never uniform. I have tried 
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to show, however, that the majority of the episcopate, and particularly 
the leaders, had no illusions. Their insistence on the incorporation 
of the secret annex to the Concordat, despite the knowledge that uni-
versal military service was denied to Germany by the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, demonstrated that the bishops had a fairly sound grasp of 
Hitler's intentions and the nature of the Nazi state. Unfortunately, 
a full understanding of the Nazi state was never as clear to the ma-
jority of the episcopate as it was to Bishop Preysing or Cardinal 
Schulte. Most church leaders would not appreciate that they were fac-
ing a "life and death" situation until late 1933, when the Nazis es-
tablished for good that they would not abide by the spirit or terms 
of the Concordat. Of course, some would not accept the fact even then. 
Interesting parallels can be drawn between the Kulturkampf and 
the position of the Church in 1933. The more significant focus on the 
differences between the two periods. In the late nineteenth century 
the Catholic Church had the support of a strong political party, a 
spirited press, and the unquestioned allegiance of the overwhelming 
number of Catholics. This was not the case in 1933. To make matters 
worse, Hitler was not Bismarck. Hitler had a much better grasp of the 
power of Catholicism and much greater powers of state at his own dis-
posal. 
All this is to say that the bishops were in a desperate situation 
in 1933. After March 28 they were in the unenviable position where 
cooperation--with the Vatican and National Socialism both--was their 
only real alternative. They had no choice but to wait for a Reichs-
konkordat and hope that it addressed their concerns. When it did not, 
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and when loss of the Concordat became a greater concern than their 
doubts about its enforcement, they had little choice but to encourage 
ratification. In the final analysis, however, the decision to ratify 
the Concordat was the decision to negotiate it, and the German bishops 
were far more reluctant to take that initial step than was the Vatican. 
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